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ABSTRACT
Uncertainty as to the optimum extent of protection has generally 
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copyright. This article explores the relationship between copyright 
scope, doctrinal efficiency and welfare from a theoretical 
perspective to develop a framework for evaluating specific 
doctrinal recommendations in copyright law. The usefulness of 
applying this framework in either rejecting or improving doctrinal 
recommendations is illustrated with reference to the predominant 
law and economics theories of fair use.
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INTRODUCTION 
The reach of copyright law has become the subject of an increasingly heated and 
polarized debate. On one side of that debate, Lawrence Lessig argues that copyright – a 
law which originally only regulated publishers – has expanded so dramatically that it now 
regulates every conceivable use of work in digital form.  Lessig warns that this 
unprecedented level of control allows large corporate interests to “lock-down culture and 
control creativity.”1  On the other side of the debate, Paul Goldstein argues that we should 
“extend [copyright] into every corner where consumers derive value from literary and 
artistic works.”2 The debate between these two extremes plays out in a number of 
different theaters, and with respect to a variety of issues. In particular, recent computer 
and internet related technological developments including peer-to-peer filesharing, digital 
music players, blogging, web-casting, and pod-casting, raise novel questions as to who 
should be entitled to dictate the relationship between existing copyrights and new 
technology. 
To find answers to these questions, a number of academics have turned to law and 
economics.3 One of the advantages of economic analysis is that it allows us to abstract 
from specific situations to general principles. However, the abstract nature of law and 
economics models of copyright has also fundamentally limited their application to 
1 LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO 
LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004).
2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: THE LAW AND LORE OF COPYRIGHT FROM 
GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX, 236 (1994).
3
 Law and economics refers broadly to the application of methods of economic analysis to legal 
problems. See, Heico Kerkmeester, General Methodology in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & ECONOMICS
(1999), available at http://encyclo.findlaw.com/0400book.pdf. (Reviewing the literature on the methodology 
of law and economics.)
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specific doctrinal debates within copyright. If law and economics is to be anything more 
than a way to explain copyright so that economists can understand it, it must lend itself to 
doctrinal recommendations that go beyond the truism that judges should do what is 
efficient. This article explores the limits and the potential of law and economics to make a 
significant contribution of our understanding of copyright doctrine.4
This article builds on previous scholarship questioning the scope of copyright,5
and extends that analysis into a more systematic inquiry within a law and economics
framework.  Existing scholarship questioning the scope of copyright tends to focus on 
either the public goods nature of information or the positive externalities of information 
production,6 whereas this article focuses primarily on the relationship between copyright 
scope and doctrinal efficiency.7
Claims that copyright is either unnecessary or too broad in specific applications
are a staple part of modern copyright scholarship. These descriptions of excessive 
copyright are usually coupled with a variety of tailored suggestions as to how the law 
4
 This Article builds on a significant body of literature relating to the law and economics of 
copyright in general. See,  Wendy J. Gordon and Robert G. Bone, Copyright in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
LAW & ECONOMICS (1999), available at http://encyclo.findlaw.com/1610book.pdf (Reviewing 
economically-oriented contributions to copyright scholarship.)
5 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV
1031 (2005); Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, 89 
MINN. L. REV. 917 (2005); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE (2004); James Boyle, The Second Enclosure 
Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 (2003); LAWRENCE 
LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (2001); Yochai 
Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation Toward Sustainable 
Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 561 (2000); LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS 
OF CYBERSPACE (1999); Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on 
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999); Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: 
The New Economic Orthodoxy of “Rights Management”, 97 MICH. L. REV. 462 (1998); Mark A. Lemley, 
The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1000-05 (1997) 
Lawrence Lessig, Intellectual Property and Code, 11 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 635 (1996); Glynn S. 
Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483, 491-92 (1996); 
Neil W. Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283 (1996).
6 See e.g., Brett M. Frischmann, supra note 5. (Developing a comprehensive theory of the role of 
uncaptured positive externalities in the context of infrastructure.) 
7
 These terms are defined more exactly in Part II.B and Part II.D respectively. 
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could be altered to remediate them.8 Compulsory licenses and the application of the fair 
use doctrine are particularly popular candidates in this regard.9
The other side of the copyright debate is reflected in claims that the current 
effective scope of copyright is not enough to provide the right incentives for the creation 
of new works. This view was especially evident in submissions made to the Supreme 
Court in its most recent case dealing with the adaptation of copyright law to new 
technology –MGM Studios v. Grokster.10 For example, Nobel Prize winning economist 
Kenneth Arrow and his fellow amici argued that the liability rule adopted by the Ninth 
Circuit in Grokster was inefficient because it failed to give technology developers any 
incentive to deter infringement.11 In a similar vein, Peter Menell et al called for the Court 
to decide questions of indirect liability for copyright infringement by balancing “the harm 
8 See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law and Subject Matter Specificity: The 
Case Of Computer Software, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 203 (2005) (noting that a number of courts 
have significantly adapted copyright doctrines to deal with special features of the computer software 
market, and concluding that these adaptations have, by and large, positively sought to strike a balance 
between incentive and access).  Jeffrey A. Andrews, Reversing Copyright Misuse: Enforcing Contractual 
Prohibitions on Software Reverse Engineering, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 975, 977-978 (2004) (Noting that in 
response to concerns about the overprotection of functional elements of software, courts have begun to use 
the doctrine of misuse as a tool to hold certain copyrights unenforceable.) Brett Frischmann & Dan Moylan, 
The Evolving Common Law Doctrine of Copyright Misuse: A Unified Theory and Its Application to 
Software, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 865, 898-900 (2000). Lisa P. Ramsey, Intellectual Property Rights in 
Advertising (working paper 2005). Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Consumers and Creative Destruction: Fair Use
Beyond Market Failure, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 539 (2003) (finding that because “consumer copying does 
little to reduce the incentives for creation because, for the most part, the creation of music is not funded by 
the sale of copies of that music.”). Jeffrey H. Brown, They Don't Make Music the Way They Used To”: The 
Legal Implications of Sampling in Contemporary Music, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1941, 1987 (1992). (Proposing 
a compulsory license for sampling). Chris Johnstone, Underground Appeal: A Sample of the Chronic 
Questions in Copyright Law Pertaining to the Transformative Use of Digital Music in a Civil Society, 51 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 569, 594 (2004) (Proposing a compulsory license for sampling, but limited to 
transformative uses.) Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip Hop: Musical Borrowing, Copyright 
And Cultural Context, 84 N.C.L. REV. 547, 638 (2006) (Suggesting a liability rule framework to “facilitate 
access to copyrighted works for those whose aesthetic style incorporates use of existing works while 
retaining the economic rights of copyright owners to receive compensation for uses of their creations.”)
9 Id.
10
 MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
11
 MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., Brief of Amici Curiae Kenneth J. Arrow et al in Support Of 
Petitioners, 2004 U.S. Briefs 480, 3 (U.S. S. Ct. Briefs 2005).
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to copyright owners against adverse effects on consumers from the loss of non-infringing 
uses from dual-use technologies.”12
Calls for tailoring copyright in response to specific circumstances are likely to 
remain part of the academic and political landscape for some time. Commenting on this 
trend, Joseph Liu argues that the essential character of U.S. copyright law is changing 
from “a judicially administered, industry-neutral property rights regime” to a “far more 
complex and industry-specific” allocation of rights and responsibilities.13 This 
phenomenon is by no means limited to Congress and the Copyright Office. Federal 
Judges have also shown a willingness to apply copyright doctrine as a set of policy levers 
in a wide range of cases, a practice especially evident in the law relating to fair use.14
Copyright demands tailoring, both judicially and legislatively, because of its broad 
rights and even broader potential application.15 But even if we accept that copyright 
doctrines should be used as levers to more perfectly tailor the law, we still need a 
mechanism to select which lever to pull and to understand when the costs of such 
tailoring are likely to exceed the benefits. The limits and untapped possibilities of an 
economic analysis of copyright in making these determinations are the subject of this 
Article.
This article develops an economic model of copyright scope and doctrinal 
efficiency as a vehicle for evaluating the welfare implications of changes in the breadth of 
12
 MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., Brief of Amici Curie Peter S. Menell et al in Support of 
Petitioners, 2004 U.S. Briefs 480, 3 (U.S. S. Ct. Briefs 2005)
13
 Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C.L. REV. 87 (2004) (Exploring the implications of 
the increasingly regulatory nature of U.S. copyright law.)
14
 See, Matthew Sag, God In The Machine: A New Structural Analysis Of Copyright's Fair Use 
Doctrine, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 381 (Arguing that the fair use doctrine constitutes a 
deliberate delegation of policy making responsibility from the legislature to the judiciary.) 
15
 See, Michael Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual Property Law
(Working paper) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=820308. 
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the rights vested in copyright owners.16 Like other economic models of copyright, this 
model does not provide a basis for evaluating individual cases, but unlike traditional 
models, this model establishes a set of metrics by which to assess specific doctrinal 
recommendations. This transition from abstract economics to practical application sets 
this Article apart from much of the existing literature. By developing and then applying a 
set of metrics for assessing doctrinal proposals, this article bridges the gap between 
general analysis of the desirable level of copyright and specific doctrinal 
recommendations. This Article demonstrates the usefulness of these metrics in the context 
of a critical analysis of the predominant law and economics theories of the fair use
doctrine.
The structure of this Article is as follows. By way of introduction, Part I reviews
the fundamental law and economics accounts of copyright.  Part II explores the 
relationship between copyright scope, doctrinal efficiency and welfare from a theoretical 
perspective to develop a law and economics framework for evaluating specific doctrinal 
proposals. Part III then applies that framework to a critique of the current law and 
economics of fair use.  
16
 The standard economic definition of social welfare is the sum of all individual utilities, but 
determining which factors contribute to welfare in the context of copyright is difficult. For example, one 
can not simply assume that all books are of equal value, all movies are of equal value, or even that the 
average value of books and movies are the same.  Furthermore, in the digital age there is no real scarcity of 
information, merely a scarcity of useful information.
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PART I – THE PECULIAR QUALITIES OF INFORMATION: A Brief 
Introduction To The Law And Economics Of Copyright 
This Part introduces the essentials of the law and economics of copyright. 
Traditional law and economics provides a rationale for both the existence of exclusive 
rights over information, in the form of copyright, and for the limited nature of those 
rights.17 The basic dilemma of intellectual property is encapsulated by Stewart Brand’s 
observation that “Information wants to be free. Information also wants to be expensive.”18
Information wants to be free in the sense that, once produced, information is cheap to 
copy, distribute and recombine.  Information wants to be expensive in the sense that, for 
information producers to recover their fixed costs of creation, they need to be able to 
charge more than just the low marginal cost of copying which results from a competitive 
market. 
In its pure form, information is a public good, meaning that it is both non-
excludable and nonrivalrous.19 The non-excludable nature of information means that 
those who produce it often find it difficult to keep the benefits to themselves.20 Consider 
the following example.  Amy, a budding novelist, plans to write a novel at an expected 
initial cost $100 (called the “cost of expression”).  Amy also expects that, once written, it 
will only cost her $1 to make copies of her novel for distribution.  There are 10 potential 
buyers of Amy’s work, each with a different valuation ranging from Bill, for whom the 
novel is worth $20 to Kevin for whom the novel is worth only $11. If Amy was able to 
17
 This review is unnecessary for readers who are already familiar with the law and economics of 
copyright.
18 STEWART BRAND, THE MEDIA LAB: INVENTING THE FUTURE AT MIT (1987). Information does 
not “want” anything in the cognitive sense, but it does have certain tendencies and characteristics that can 
be usefully summarized by recourse to such anthropomorphic terms.
19 STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 157–159 (2004).
20 Id.
MATTHEW J. SAG COPYRIGHT SCOPE AND DOCTRINAL EFFICIENCY  DRAFT  3/23/06 
9
sell 10 copies of her novel at $11 each, she would be able to recover both her initial cost 
of expression and her marginal cost (the cost of printing each additional volume).  
Unfortunately for Amy she is unlikely to be able to charge that price because once she 
sells a copy to her first customer, Bill, he will also be able to make copies and offer to sell 
them to the remaining customers.  Bill’s cost of expression is zero, since he did not write 
the novel, so Bill can make a profit by selling at any price above his marginal cost of 
copying.  If Amy cannot stop Bill free-riding on her work, she will abandon the idea of 
becoming a novelist and pursue an alternative career instead, a sub-optimal outcome for 
both Amy and her customers.
Amy’s story illustrates the classic economic rationale for the creation of exclusive 
rights in information in general, and copyright in particular.  Without the legal artifact of 
exclusivity, Amy’s competitors will face a lower average cost of production for her novel 
than she does.21 Consequently, faced with the choice between creating and copying, it 
makes more sense to copy.  To put it another way, in a competitive market, the market 
price will be that of the lowest cost producer, which the author will never be.  As such, 
without some mechanism to appropriate the benefits of their investments, authors and 
publishers will under-invest in the production of information products.  Copyright 
skeptics point out that authors invest in writing for many reasons beyond the financial 
rewards that copyright law provides. This is true but it should not obscure the point that, 
the author’s hope of commercial success is often what keeps them chained to the 
typewriter and keeps their publisher paying the rent.
21
 This is based on the assumption that both parties face the same marginal cost. But even if the 
subsequent producer has a higher marginal cost than the author, he will still have a lower average cost, as 
long as his marginal cost is less than the original author’s marginal cost plus her average fixed costs.
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The function of copyright protection in resolving the under-investment problem in 
relation to expressive works is well understood.22 Copyright rights allow an  author to 
internalize more of the benefits of her creations; or in the jargon of economics, copyright 
facilitates the internalization of a work’s positive externalities and limits free riding.23
It is important to note the functionalism of the law and economics approach to 
copyright. The exclusive rights vested in authors do not exist by virtue of natural or 
inherent rights, they are simply a means to an end. This view finds support in copyright’s 
constitutional mandate. Congress is empowered to enact laws such as copyright for the 
purpose of promoting “the progress of science and the useful arts.”24 The Constitution 
does not appear to contemplate granting exclusive rights to authors purely for their
personal enrichment. As the Supreme Court has commented on a number of occasions, 
the constitutional authority for copyright is expressly for the purpose of the promotion of 
science and useful arts, and copyright rewards to authors are means to that end, not an end 
in themselves.25 This is consistent with a law and economics theory of copyright.
22 See Peter S. Menell & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property, in THE HANDBOOK OF LAW 
AND ECONOMICS (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds. forthcoming), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=741424.  Note also that government grants of exclusive rights in information are 
not the only solution to this problem. There are in fact a number of proposals to replace intellectual property 
with prizes and government subsidies. See for example, Steven Shavell & Tanguy Van Ypersele, Rewards 
Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525 (2001); Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent 
Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115 (2003).
23
 Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. Econ. Rev. Papers & Proc. No. 2 
(1967). A positive externality arises when at least some benefits of an activity spill over to parties not 
directly involved in the activity. In contrast, free riders are actors who obtain the benefits of an activity, but 
do not share its costs. The “free rider problem” is the question of how to prevent free riding from taking 
place, or at least limit its effects.
24
 Article I, § 8, of the Constitution provides that “Congress shall have Power . . . To Promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”
25
 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (The monopoly 
privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special 
private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by which an important public purpose may be achieved. 
It is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, 
and to allow the public access to the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has 
expired.) See also, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 (2003) (copyright law celebrates the profit motive, 
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Various regimes of intellectual property address the non-excludability of 
information by making certain classes of information exclusive-in-law, even though they
cannot make them actually exclusive-in-fact. However, the exclusive rights established by 
regimes such as copyright only address one half of the public good problem of 
information. The other half of the public good problem, the nonrivalrous nature of 
information, must still be accounted for.  A nonrivalrous good is one for which one 
person’s use does not affect the value of any other person’s use.26  For example, while a 
photographic print is a tangible physical object, it also embodies creative expression. If I 
take the print from your living room, you are deprived of the enjoyment of seeing it there; 
on the other hand, if I merely reproduce the print, you still have the original and yet I now 
have one too.  The photo qua object is rivalrous; the photo qua artistic expression is non-
rivalrous.27
The non-rivalrous nature of information makes the welfare implications of 
intellectual property different to those of other forms of property: the incentives attributed 
to allocating property rights in information must be off-set against the resulting under-
recognizing that the incentive to profit from the exploitation of copyrights will redound to the public benefit 
by resulting in the proliferation of knowledge.  The profit motive is the engine that ensures the progress of 
science.) 
26
 See e.g. Richard Cornes & Todd Sandler, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND 
CLUB GOODS 39 (1996) (defining nonrivalry as a situation in which a unit of a good can be consumed by 
one individual without detracting, in the slightest, from the consumption opportunities still available to 
others from that same unit.)
27
 Note that the artistic expression aspect of the work becomes rivalrous if its value lies in part in 
its uniqueness. It is for this reason that many photographers release a predetermined limited number of 
prints of any given photo. 
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utilization of that information.28 In other words, there is a trade-off between the author’s 
incentive to produce a work and the public’s interest in access to that work.29
The author’s exclusive rights under copyright law provide a buffer against price 
competition.30 This competitive buffer allows the author to charge higher prices than she 
otherwise would, which in turn has two immediate effects. First, some consumers remain 
willing to purchase the work at a higher price and consequently pay more. Assuming we 
value the welfare of both consumers and authors equally, this is simply a wealth transfer 
and is welfare neutral. Second, those who are unwilling to pay the higher price are forced 
to go without the work in question.31 Market allocation of scarce recourses to their highest 
valued use is usually welfare enhancing, but for nonrivalrous goods, the exclusion of low 
value users produces a deadweight loss32 because their consumption is not at the expense 
of another who values the good more.  
Taking both the non-excludable and non-rivalrous nature of information into 
account suggests that there is an inevitable trade-off between efficiency in production and 
efficiency in consumption. As the Supreme Court noted in Sony v Universal:
28 KENNETH J. ARROW, ECONOMIC WELFARE AND THE ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES FOR 
INVENTION, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 
614-15 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research ed., 1962); Richard R. Nelson, The Simple Economics of Basic 
Scientific Research, 67 J. POL. ECON. 297, 297–306 (1959).
29 Id. See also Menell & Scotchmer, supra note 22, at 3. (The main defect of intellectual property is 
that it results in a dead weight loss to consumers).
30
 While subsequent authors can offer other works in competition with the author, no one may offer 
the exact same work, or a substantially similar work, to the public without the author’s permission.  It is the 
author’s expectation of the ability to price above marginal cost that induces her investment in production in 
the first place. The copyright monopoly should not be equated with an economic monopoly because there 
may be close substitutes for the author’s work that are non-infringing. See, Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. 
Ink, Inc., 2006 U.S. LEXIS 2024 (U.S. 2006) (A patent does not necessarily confer market power upon the 
patentee. In all cases involving a tying arrangement, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant has market 
power in the tying product.)
31
 Assuming the absence of perfect price discrimination. See Kathleen Carroll and Dennis Coates, 
Teaching Price Discrimination: Some Clarification, 66 S. ECON. J. 466 (1999). (The assumption that price 
discrimination is efficient is an unfortunate oversimplification.) 
32
 Deadweight loss refers to any permanent loss of social welfare. See Shavell, supra note 19.
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[Copyright requires] a difficult balance between the interests of authors and 
inventors in the control and exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the 
one hand, and society’s competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, 
and commerce on the other hand.33
The trade-off between efficiency in production and efficiency in consumption is 
essentially a comparison of dynamic benefits and static costs.34 Copyright has dynamic 
benefits in that it creates incentives to invest in the creation of new intellectual and 
creative works. Copyright has static costs comprised of the consumer deadweight loss 
resulting from higher prices, the concentration of market power, and possible stifling of 
alternative points of view. In the classic model, the optimal assignment of copyright rights 
is determined by a balance the dynamic incentives against static deadweight losses.35
More recently, scholars have begun to question whether this simple trade-off between 
access and incentives describes the full effects of intellectual property.36 This article 
offers one such challenge to the traditional model by emphasizing the centrality of 
copyright scope and the importance of doctrinal efficiency.  
PART II – COPYRIGHT SCOPE AND DOCTRINAL EFFICIENCY 
This Part explores the relationship between copyright scope, doctrinal efficiency 
and welfare from a theoretical perspective. Establishing what is known and what is 
unknown about that relationship provides an important tool for evaluating specific 
33
 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
34 Id. at 618; See also, Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative 
Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29–41 (1991); RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
LAW 36-50 (5th ed. 1998).
35
 William Landes & Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 
325, 326 (1989).  Landes and Posner have recently expanded on their work in their recent book, THE 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2003).
36
 Tim Wu, Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Decision Architectures, 92 VA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=726561. 
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doctrinal recommendations in copyright law, especially those deriving from law and 
economics analysis.  This method is useful given the number and variety of 
recommendations that implicitly rely on some underlying theory the scope-welfare 
relationship.37 Part II.A. explains the concept of copyright scope in legal, practical and 
economic terms. It also briefly discusses how the model developed in this article differs 
from the traditional model of the welfare effects of copyright as expounded by Landes 
and Posner.38 Part II.B. develops the model in relation to copyright scope. Part II.C. then 
expands the model by introducing the concept of doctrinal efficiency. Finally, Part II.D 
explains how the abstract modeling exercise in the earlier sub-parts can be rendered into 
concrete metrics for evaluating doctrinal proposals. 
A. Copyright Scope  
What is copyright scope? The simplest way to define copyright scope is to
distinguish it from the other element of copyright protection – duration. Copyright 
duration simply refers to how long the rights of the copyright owner last. Copyright 
duration was initially a mere 14 years, renewable for another 14 years,39 but now extends 
to the life of the author plus 70 years.40 In contrast to duration, the scope or breadth of 
copyright determines the effect of the author’s rights at any given point in time. 
Copyright scope has both a formal legal dimension and a practical dimension. The 
combination of both of these dimensions defines copyright scope in economic terms. In 
formal legal terms, scope depends on the combined effects of various elements of 
37 See, supra note 8 and accompanying text.
38 See, Landes & Posner, supra note 35.
39
 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (1790 Act).
40
 For works created by identified natural persons, copyright now lasts from the moment the work 
is created until 70 years after the author’s death, see 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2005). For anonymous works, 
pseudonymous works, and works made for hire, the copyright term is 95 years from publication or 120 
years from creation, whichever expires first, 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (2005). 
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copyright law such as: the idea-expression distinction,41 the test of substantial similarity,42
the fair use doctrine,43 the doctrines of contributory and vicarious liability (together 
“secondary liability”),44 and anti-circumvention liability under the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (“DMCA”) .45 The practical dimension of copyright scope relates to the 
extent that the copyright owner’s formal legal rights can be enforced in the real world. As 
the recording industry is well aware, merely possess nominal legal rights does not mean 
that you are in a position to enforce them,46 or that you would necessarily want to.47
In economic terms, scope can be envisaged spatially, as the distance between the 
author’s work and the closest non-infringing substitute.48 Alternatively, scope can be 
thought of as determining the cost of entry into the market occupied by the copyrighted 
41
 Codified in 17 U.S.C. § 102 (b) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of 
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or 
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such 
work.”)
42 See e.g., Newton v. Diamond, 349 F.3d 591, 594 (9th Cir. 2003) (Even where the fact of copying 
is conceded, no legal consequences will follow from that fact unless the copying is substantial.) See also 1 
MELVIN B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.01 at 3-3 (2002).
43
 Codified in 17 U.S.C. § 107 (“Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair 
use of a copyrighted work, … is not an infringement of copyright.”)
44
 The Copyright Act does not expressly provide for secondary liability, but courts have 
consistently held that the doctrines of vicarious and contributory liability emerge from common law 
principles and are well established in the law.  See Sony, 464 U.S., at 434; MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, 
Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2776 (2005).
45
 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998). The anti-
circumvention provisions are codified in 17 U.S.C. § 1201.
46
 See Tim Wu, When Code Isn’t Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679, 683 2003 (Commenting that the 
“efforts of P2P programmers have provided computer-savvy music listeners with a continuing reduction in 
the costs of the copyright system, comparable to a temporary repeal of copyright laws for computer geeks.”)
47
 Matthew Sag, Twelve Year-Olds, Grandmothers, And Other Good Targets For The Recording 
Industry’s File Sharing Litigation, NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. (Forthcoming 2006) (Reviewing the 
rationality of the recording industry’s litigation against individual file sharers.)
48 See Paul Klemperer, How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?, 21 RAND J. ECON. 
113 (1990). See also Menell & Scotchmer, supra note 22, at 14; Michael Abramowicz, An Industrial 
Organization Approach To Copyright Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 33 (2004) (applying the Hotelling and 
Salop economic models of product differentiation to copyright); Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product 
Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 212 (2004) (also applying economic models of product differentiation to 
copyright, but with different conclusions). See generally JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION 96-131 (1998).
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work.49 The limit of both of these formulations is that they imply knowledge of, and 
compliance with, the law. Alternatively, we can define the scope of an individual 
copyright as the extent to which its owner can use copyright law to impose costs on third 
parties or exclude them from certain markets altogether. The advantage of this definition 
is that it looks to the real economic power copyright establishes and does not assume 
compliance with the law.
The meanings of these various formulations of copyright scope become clearer in 
application. For example in Grokster,50 the Supreme Court recently addressed the liability 
of technology developers whose products can be used for both lawful and unlawful 
purposes. In formal legal terms, it is quite clear that indiscriminately distributing copies of 
music files over the internet is within the scope of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights 
and is therefore infringing if done without permission.51 However, because of the 
practical limitations of suing end users for infringement, the copyright owners in Grokster
asked the Court to expand the scope of their rights to allow them to prevent technology 
developers from enabling end user infringement.52  In other words, the copyright owners 
sought to overcome the limits in the practical scope of their rights vis-à-vis end users by 
increasing the formal scope of their rights vis-à-vis technology developers. From an 
economic perspective the question of copyright scope in Grokster can be framed as 
follows: when does copyright in a sound recording give its owner the right to control 
49
 Nancy T. Gallini, Patent Policy and Costly Imitation, 23 RAND J. ECON. 52 (1992). See also, 
Menell & Scotchmer, supra note 22, at 14.
50
 MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
51
 A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1018-1019 (9th Cir. 2001). See also BMG Music 
v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888, 891 (7th Cir. 2005). 
52
 MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2775 (2005). (“When a widely shared 
service or product is used to commit infringement, it may be impossible to enforce rights in the protected 
work effectively against all direct infringers, the only practical alternative being to go against the distributor 
of the copying device for secondary liability on a theory of contributory or vicarious infringement.”)
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technology that may be used to reproduce or distribute copies of that sound recording? 
The Supreme Court chose to answer only a fragment of this question in Grokster. The 
Court unanimously concluded that “one who distributes a device with the object of 
promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative 
steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third 
parties.”53 The majority opinion was content to decide the case on inducement and 
expressly declined to revisit Sony any further.54 Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s decision 
expands the scope of the rights held by the motion picture and music recording industries, 
but nearly as much as they had hoped for.55
Reverse engineering computer software provides a second example of the 
different formulations of copyright scope. Reverse engineering requires making copies of 
copyrighted computer software and thus superficially appears to be copyright 
infringement.56 However, reverse engineering is only necessary because software 
distributed in object code contains ideas and performs functions that are not entitled to 
copyright protection.57 If reverse engineering was found to be infringement, the practical 
scope of the copyright owner’s rights would be extended far beyond the expression of her 
53 Id. at 2776.
54 Id. at 2778-2779. The concurring opinion of Justice Ginsburg (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justice Kennedy) would have substantially narrowed the application of the Sony doctrine by adopting a 
ratio test in relation to substantial non-infringing use. Id. at .2783. In contrast the concurring opinion of 
Justice Breyer (joined by Justice Stevens and O'Connor) expressly rejected the application of a ratio test in 
relation to substantial non-infringing use. Id. at 2788.
55
 The Grokster decision is discussed in more detail below, see infra Part II.D.
56 See, 17 U.S.C. 106 (Copyright owner’s exclusive rights include the right to reproduce the work.)
57 See, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (b). For an explanation of the difference between source code and object 
code, see, Daniel Lin, Matthew Sag & Ronald S. Laurie, Source Code Versus Object Code: Patent 
Implications for the Open Source Community, 18 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 235, 238-239 
(2002). 
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ideas. Courts have understandable resisted this outcome and applied the fair use doctrine 
to limit the scope of copyright in this regard.58
In reverse engineering and other fair use contexts, courts have directly confronted 
the question of the economic scope of copyright.  The fourth statutory factor that courts 
must consider in adjudicating fair use cases is the effect of the defendant’s use “upon the 
potential market for, or value of, the copyrighted work.”59 In applying this factor, courts 
must not only consider whether there is a market effect in general, they must also 
determine whether the defendant’s conduct intrudes on the legitimate scope of the 
copyright owner’s rights. For example, in Campbell, the Supreme Court drew an 
important distinction between the copyright owner’s general economic interests from the 
limited protection afforded by copyright.60 The Court held that copyright neither protects 
the author from parody, nor recognizes a protectable derivative market for criticism in 
general.61  Just as Campbell recognizes that criticism is outside of the copyright owner’s 
protectable sphere of interest, the reverse engineering cases recognize that the copyright 
owner has no protectable interest in preventing the copying of unprotectable expression 
and ideas buried within its object code. In Sony v Connectix, the Ninth Circuit held that 
although the defendant’s Virtual Game Station console directly competed with Sony in 
the market for gaming platforms compatible with Sony games, the Virtual Game Station 
58 See e.g., Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 602 (9th Cir. 
2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 871 (2000) (“We are called upon once again to apply the principles of 
copyright law to computers and their software, to determine what must be protected as expression and what 
must be made accessible to the public as function.”); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 
832 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Sega Enter. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1520 (9th Cir. 1992); see also 
David A. Rice, Copyright and Contract: Preemption After Bowers v. Baystate, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. 
REV. 595, 601 n.19 (2004) (further references).
59
 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2005). The statutory codification of the fair use doctrine requires courts to 
consider four factors in determining whether a use is fair: (1) the purpose and character of the use; (2) the 
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion taken; and (4) the effect of 
the use upon the potential market for, or value of, the copyrighted work. Id.
60
 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 591-592 (1994).
61 Id. at 592.
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was a “legitimate competitor” in that market.62 The court concluded that Sony's desire to 
control the market for gaming platforms was “understandable” but that “copyright law ... 
does not confer such a monopoly.”63
The potential application of secondary liability to the makers of peer-to-peer 
technology and the application of fair use to reverse engineering both illustrate the 
importance of understanding copyright scope from an economic dimension and how that 
economic understanding ultimately feeds back into doctrinal questions. 
The model of the welfare effects of copyright scope developed in the next section 
is clearly influenced by William Landes and Richard Posner’s pioneering article, An 
Economic Analysis of Copyright.64 The Landes and Posner model of the welfare effects 
of copyright describes the operation of copyright by analyzing the extent of copyright 
protection, broadly defined. The core difficulty with the Landes and Posner approach is 
that knowledge of the optimum level of copyright protection does not translate directly 
into the types of doctrinal decisions that judges have to make.65
The traditional single variable model’s focus on overall copyright reward comes at 
the cost of significant indeterminacy.  The Landes and Posner model treats copyright 
protection as a single variable (Z) and examines the relationship between Z, the cost of 
62
 Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 607 (9th Cir. 2000); see 
also, Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1522-23 (9th Cir. 1993).
63
 Sony Computer, 203 F.3d at 607; see also, Sega, 977 F.2d at 1523-24 (An attempt to monopolize 
the market by making it impossible for others to compete runs counter to the statutory purpose of promoting 
creative expression and cannot constitute a strong equitable basis for resisting the invocation of the fair use 
doctrine).
64
 Landes & Posner, supra note 35.
65
 This is the same observation that Robert Merges and Richard Nelson made with respect to patent 
law over 15 years ago, but its application to copyright has rarely been systematically pursued. See, Robert P. 
Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 875 
(1990). Mark Lemley’s comparison of the treatment of incremental innovation in patent and copyright 
comes closest. See Lemley, The Economics of Improvement, supra note 5Error! Bookmark not defined..  
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producing copyrightable works, and the number of works produced.66 Landes and Posner
developed their model as a vehicle through which to examine the field of copyright as a 
whole from an economic standpoint, and to see to what extent copyright law could be 
explained as a means for promoting the efficient allocation of resources.67  In that context, 
the model serves its purpose, but as a vehicle for translating economic analysis into 
doctrinal recommendations, the model is limited by its own generality.68
Assuming that our core interest lies in the economic analysis of individual 
copyright doctrines,69 the Landes and Posner model can be simplified by treating duration 
as exogenous.  Another reason to treat duration as exogenous to economic models of 
copyright is that it appears to be determined solely with reference to political criteria, not 
social welfare criteria.70 After the Supreme Court’s validation of the CTEA in Eldred,71 it 
is clear that no matter how ill-conceived the congressional policy in favor of long (and 
expanding) copyright terms is, nothing written by economists or law professors is likely 
66
 Landes & Posner, supra note 35, at 325.
67 Id.
68
 Landes and Posner do undertake a significant normative analysis of copyright doctrine, but that 
analysis is largely disconnected from their model. Additionally, the authors’ doctrinal recommendations are 
primarily in the form of ex post justifications for existing doctrines. Id. at 344 -63. See James Boyle, A 
Theory of Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail, and Insider Trading, 80 CAL. L. REV.
1413, 1447 (1992) (“Landes and Posner describe copyright as constructed by the tension between the need 
to grant legally protected interests to authors in order to motivate them and the need to limit the rights of 
authors so as to allow future creators legal access to the raw materials they need. This seems reasonable 
enough, but it also leaves them dangerously close to the mushy “balancing” analysis from which economics 
was supposed to provide surcease.”)
69
 Which is not the primary purpose for which Landes and Posner designed their model. Landes & 
Posner, supra note35, at 325.
70
 This is the predominant view, see Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: 
Intellectual Property Law, 1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187, 2236-37 (2000) (describing the CTEA 
extension as “virtually worthless” from an incentive perspective, and “a classic instance of almost pure rent-
seeking legislation.”). See also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 255 (U.S., 2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
There are exceptions. See, e.g., Stan J. Liebowitz & Stephen Margolis, Seventeen Famous Economists 
Weigh In On Copyright: The Role Of Theory, Empirics, And Network Effects, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 435 
(2005).
71
 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). In 1988, Congress enacted the Sonny Bono Copyright 
Term Extension Act (CTEA) which extended the terms of all existing and future copyrights by a further 20 
years. In Eldred, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the CTEA and rejected the argument that a 
retrospective term extension violates the “limited times” prescription of the Copyright Clause. Id.
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to change it. The appropriate combination of duration and scope in copyright is an 
interesting intellectual puzzle, but for the reasons given above, copyright scope should be 
the focus of our analysis, taking the current (extraordinarily long) duration as given.72
B. The Welfare Effects of Changes in Copyright Scope  
This section develops a model of the welfare effects of a change in copyright 
scope in four stages. First, it begins with a simple intuitive model of the welfare effects of 
a change in copyright scope by imagining the consequences of the opposing extremes of 
copyright scope: S0 such that only identical works are capable of infringement, and S
such that even the slightest similarity rendered liability for infringement.  This simple 
model leads to the proposition that the welfare/scope curve is convex, such that the 
optimum level of copyright scope is more than nothing (S0), but less than everything (S).  
The second stage complicates the model by considering the effect of private 
ordering, i.e. the effective market reallocation of rights through licensing or the 
consolidation of production into firms. Advocates of efficient private ordering reject the 
automatic conclusion that increasing copyright scope is likely to increase the cost of 
expression more than it increases the incentive effect. They acknowledge that an increase 
in copyright scope may raise the cost of expression for some authors, but they argue that 
those costs will, on average, be off-set by their increased prospective reward.73
The fourth and final stage adds further complexity by arguing that there is no 
singular welfare-scope relationship. Instead, different industries, markets, and modes of 
72
 This analysis does not take into account the economic function that formalities once had in 
copyright. See Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485 (2004).
73
 See, e.g. Menell & Scotchmer, supra note 22, 23-24; Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The 
Impact Of Automated Rights Management On Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REV. 557, 584 
(1998); I. Trotter Hardy, Property in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 217. 
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production will experience different welfare-scope relationships simultaneously. 
Empirical assessment of the likely welfare effects of a change in copyright scope is 
rendered extremely difficult by the indeterminacy of copyright scope and the likelihood of 
inter-industry effects. This suggests that attempts to calibrate individual copyright 
doctrines to optimize scope may be more difficult than previously acknowledged. 
Stage 1: The simple model
The welfare effects of an increase in copyright scope are uncertain in the abstract. 
Like copyright protection more generally, any change in copyright scope will have effects
on (i) the author’s potential reward for the production of a work, (ii) the author’s cost of 
expression and (iii) the administrative costs of the copyright system.
In isolation, the prospect of an increased reward should increase the production of 
copyrighted works. However, the same expansion of copyright scope may also increase 
the author’s cost of expression. For example, faced with a legal regime that required brief 
quotations to be licensed, some authors would expend resources on attaining such 
licenses, whereas other would find it more economical to avoid that cost by summarizing 
instead of quoting. In either case, such a regime increases the cost of expression for 
second generation authors.74 An expansion of copyright scope might also increase the 
administrative costs of the copyright system, depending on the nature of the rule in 
question.  For example, a rule that requires case by case adjudication would tend to cause 
more cases to be litigated and would thus increase state expenditure on judges, court 
houses etc. The net effect of increasing copyright scope will depend on whether the costs 
of expansion outweigh the benefits, or vice-versa.  
74
 The term second generation author refers to an author whose work requires the use of part of the 
work of a previous author. 
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Assume for the moment that the scope of copyright was so narrow as to permit 
any kind of re-use of a work unless it was a virtually identical reproduction of the  original 
work. In that case, an expansion of copyright scope would almost certainly be welfare 
improving, as the positive effects of increased incentives would dominate any concerns as 
to the increased cost of expression. In this scenario, rival publishers could reprint an 
author’s work with only superficial changes, thus making it more difficult for the author 
to recover her investment or make a profit. Expanding the scope of copyright from this 
narrow starting point is likely to increase the author’s ability to price over marginal cost 
and will create better incentives for the investment of time and resources into the 
production of copyrightable works. But note that because almost every copyrightable 
work relates in some fashion to works that preceded it, increasing copyright scope to the 
point of infinite breadth will increase the author’s cost of expression more than it adds to 
her investment incentives.  
Figure 1 represents the intuition that there is some ideal or maximally efficient 
scope of copyright. It represents welfare on the vertical axis and scope on the horizontal 
axis. The welfare-scope curve is convex, such that there exists a point S*, the level of 
scope at which welfare is maximized. An increase in scope from Sqo to S* will be welfare 
improving, but any further increase (from S* to onwards) has the reverse effect, as the 
difficulty of creating new works while incorporating less and less of existing works 
begins to overwhelm the incentive effects.75
75
 The notation used here is as follows: S denotes copyright scope, Sq denotes the status quo level 
of copyright scope, the super-scripts o and p denote copyright optimism and copyright pessimism as 
explained in the text. W denoted social welfare, Wq denotes the status quo level of welfare, W* denotes the 
maximum level of welfare achieved at the apex of the scope/welfare curve. 
MATTHEW J. SAG COPYRIGHT SCOPE AND DOCTRINAL EFFICIENCY  DRAFT  3/23/06 
24







This representation of the welfare effects of copyright scope does not indicate 
whether the current level of copyright scope is in fact greater than or less than S*. Views 
on this question sharply diverge. Paul Goldstein neatly summarizes the opposing 
viewpoints in his description of “copyright optimism” versus “copyright pessimism.”
Goldstein frames the debate as follows:  
On one side are lawyers who assert that copyright is rooted in natural justice, 
entitling authors to every last penny that other people will pay to obtain copies of 
their works. These are the copyright optimists: they view copyright’s cup of 
entitlement as always half-full, only waiting to be filled still further. On the other 
side of the debate are copyright pessimists, who see copyright's cup as half empty: 
they accept that copyright owners should get some measure of control over copies 
as an incentive to produce creative works, but they would like copyright to extend 
only so far as an encroachment on the general freedom of everyone to write and 
say what they please.76
76 Goldstein, supra note 2 at 15.
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Copyright pessimists and copyright optimists disagree about where the status quo 
(Sq) is on the scope/welfare curve. Copyright pessimists accept that intellectual property 
protection is beneficial up to a point, but they argue that the current climate of broad 
exclusive rights has extended copyright too far.77 The copyright pessimist view is 
represented on Figure 1 by the point (Sqp, Wq), at which the curve is downward-sloping,
with any increase in scope causing a reduction in net welfare.  In contrast, copyright 
optimists believe that greater protection of intellectual property will encourage even 
further investment.78 The copyright optimist view is represented on Figure 1 by the point 
(Sqo, Wq), at which the curve is upward-sloping with any increase in scope improving net 
welfare. Note that both Sqp and Sqo are associated with welfare level Wq, illustrating that it 
is possible to agree on the current benefits of the copyright system but still disagree on 
whether copyright scope is too broad, or too narrow. 
The intuition that there are diminishing returns to increasing the scope of 
copyright is reflected in common law statements about the  importance of safeguarding 
sequential innovation. In Campbell v. Acuff Rose, the Supreme Court identified an 
… inherent tension in the need simultaneously to protect copyrighted material and 
to allow others to build upon it.79
The Court, borrowing from Justice Story in Emerson v. Davies, also said that
… in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, few, if any, things, 
which in an abstract sense, are strictly new and original throughout. Every book in 
literature, science and art, borrows, and must necessarily borrow, and use much 
which was well known and used before.80
77 See, e.g., LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 1. 
78
 Goldstein himself falls into this camp; his recommendation is essentially to “extend rights into 
every corner where consumers derive value from literary and artistic works.” GOLDSTEIN, supra note2, at 
236. 
79
 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994).
80 Id. See also, Carey v. Kearsley, 170 Eng. Rep. 679, 681 (K. B. 1803), per Lord Ellenborough.
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This common law view is reflected in the simple model.
Stage 2: The effects of private ordering
The problem with the simple model is that it fails to take into account the 
mitigating effects of private ordering. The simple model overstates the extent to which 
copyright scope must be limited because, even assuming that all authors do in fact borrow
from pre-existing works, second generation authors can avoid conflicting property rights
through private ordering. Menell and Scotchmer argue that if firms can license to avoid 
conflicting property rights, rather than being forced into the costly activity of avoiding 
them, the harm of too much protection may be largely reversed.81 Although Menell and 
Scotchmer’s argument concentrates on private ordering through the licensing (the 
market), efficient private ordering can also be achieved through the collectivization of 
information production (the firm).82
The prospect of efficient private ordering fundamentally challenges the simple 
model’s assumption that increasing copyright scope is likely to increase the cost of 
expression more than the incentive effect at some point. As Ronald Coase (another Nobel 
Prize winning economist) made clear, the initial legal allocation of legal entitlements 
should not be confused with their ultimate allocation by the market.83 For example, a
court may give party A the right to pollute, or it may give party B the right not to be 
polluted; either way the parties will trade their rights if the other party values the right 
more. Theoretically, if the market for intellectual property rights was perfectly efficient, 
any increase in the cost of expression caused by an expansion of copyright scope could be
81
 Menell & Scotchmer, supra note 22, at 24.
82 See, Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937), reprinted in Ronald H. 
Coase, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 33 (1988).
83
 Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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off-set by the increased expected rewards.84  Subsequent authors seeking to build on an 
existing work may face higher costs, but those costs should be off-set by their increased 
prospective reward.85
In a Coasian world, without transaction costs or other market imperfections, there 
is no reason to assume that increasing copyright scope ever reduces welfare. But it must 
also be noted that in a truly Coasian world, there would be no reason to assume that any 
level of copyright scope was superior. The reason for this is that if there are literally no 
transaction costs, an author can contract with the whole world to obtain their assurance of 
sufficient rewards for her endeavors – she does not need copyright. Similarly, if copyright 
broad copyright scope does no harm in a zero transaction cost world because second 
generation authors can always contract with copyright owners for any rights they need. 
In a Coasian world we could replace copyright with contract entirely, or we could 
have neither and rely on the government to reward each author with the exact social value 
of her creation. The Coase theory has important implications because it suggests that 
when there are transaction costs that property rights should be allocated to minimize 
them, but the conversely, the theory implies that in a zero transactions cost world every 
possible allocation is equally attractive.  It is important to understand that we do not have 
property rights because there are no transaction costs,  we have property rights to reduce 
transaction costs and because sometimes property rights are the lowest transaction costs
solution. So the relevant assumption is for efficient private ordering is not that there are 
84
 In theory, increasing the ratio of the copyright owner’s private benefit to the social benefit of a 
work should perfect her incentives to produce. But that assumes that the process of internalization does not 
reduce the overall size of the pie, as it surely must if taken to extremes. As Mark Lemley points out, “[i]n no 
other area of the economy do we permit the full internalization of social benefits.” Lemley, Property, 
Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, supra note 5, at 1032. 
85
 Menell & Scotchmer, supra note 22, at 23-24.
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no transaction costs, but rather that markets will be very efficient if property rights are 
allocated, or at least that they will be more efficient than private contract, direct 
government intervention, or the too often neglected alternative of doing nothing at all.  In 
some ways this is an optimistic assumption about markets, in other ways it is a pessimistic 
assumption about the alternatives. For the sake of brevity I will refer to this view as 
market optimism.86
The accuracy of this market optimist view of the welfare effects of copyright 
scope depends on the efficiency of private ordering. Adding fuel to the fire of optimism, 
Robert Merges points to the success of collective rights organizations such as the 
American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (“ASCAP”) and certain patent 
pools, to argue that even if transactions costs are initially high, market solutions will often 
emerge to reduce them.87  Merges describes a process whereby repeat players in high 
transaction costs industries form collective rights organizations to administer their rights, 
effectively exchanging their property entitlements for liability rules.88  This suggests that 
even where copyright pessimists can identify apparent market failures in the short run, in 
the long run the market itself will address these problems.
Although ASCAP has an impressive history, it is important to keep in mind its 
limitations.  One of ASCAP’s main functions is providing off-the-shelf licenses for the 
public performance of musical works.  From the perspective of its customers, ASCAP 
lowers search and negotiation costs authors might otherwise encounter if they had to find 
and deal with each author separately.  From the perspective of it members, ASCAP also 
86
 Julie Cohen labels proponents of similar views as “Cyber-cons.” I prefer the less pejorative term 
“market optimist.” See Cohen, supra note 5, at 464.
87
 Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective 
Rights Organizations 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1996).
88 Id.
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lowers negotiation costs; in addition it lowers the cost of monitoring and enforcing 
authors rights, which would be prohibitive on a case by case basis.  However, ASCAP 
primarily deals in the world of complete literal infringement, where rights are fairly 
certain.  There is no reason to believe that effective collective rights organizations would 
develop in scenarios of non-literal infringement in the absence of high volume, relatively
uniform transactions between repeat players.89
The case for strong market optimism in copyright is limited by the nature of the 
expansive nature of copyright itself.  It is almost axiomatic in conventional law and 
economics literature that the allocation of property rights increases certainty.90  For 
copyright, the opposite may be true.  As copyright scope expands , rights become 
increasingly vague – not increasingly well defined. So it becomes increasingly difficult to 
know whose rights you might be infringing with any given work.91 Harold Demsetz’s 
descriptive proposition that property rights evolve in response to increased value of the 
underlying object has clear application to copyright.92  The increasing importance of 
information has been one of the primary rallying points of those who advocate extending 
the scope and duration of copyright. Nonetheless, Brett Frischmann (among others) 
questions the normative gloss of the Demsetzian thesis that property rights should extend
in response to increased value.93 Where the benefits of increased propertization are 
concentrated, the application of basic public choice theory predicts that the level of 
89
 Merges acknowledges this limitation, noting that “[o]nly repeated transactions among right 
holders will give rise to the private institutions discussed in this Article. One-shot or sporadic interactions 
do not justify investments in exchange institutions.” Id. at 1319.
90
 Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207, 209 (1996)
(noting that when property rights are poorly specified, it is hard to transact about them, and correspondingly 
hard to promote the process of transaction that allocates resources to their highest valued uses).
91
 The same argument can be made with respect to copyright duration: the passage of time makes 
tracing all the possible overlapping rights holders exponentially more complicated. 
92 See Frischmann, The Demsetzian Trend in Copyright, (working paper).
93 Id.
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propertization will exceed the Demsetzian equilibrium and property rights will be 
extended beyond the point where the social benefit of propertization outweighs the social 
cost.  
Frischmann questions the merits of ever-expanding copyright for two fundamental 
reasons. First, not all externalities distort allocative decision making by the producers of 
first generation products.94 Second, the market will tend to undervalue information with 
positive externalities, especially if that information is used as infrastructure.95 There are 
other reasons to doubt that property rights should always be expanded as the value of the 
underlying object increases. Expanding the scope of copyright may increase the 
administrative costs of the copyright system, the cost of dispute resolution or other costs 
related to uncertainty costs borne by second generation authors. 
A potential cause of inefficiency that deserves greater attention is the implications 
of strategic behavior and uncertainty. Market optimists who rely on the extensive 
reallocation of permissions through licensing must take into account the increased 
significance of strategic behavior encouraged by increased market participation. 
Obviously, if a change in copyright scope increases a second generation author’s need to 
“go to the market” to attain copyright permissions, she clearly faces increased transaction 
costs. But, in addition, she must also contend with the risk that first generation authors 
will strategically use their hold-up power to extract the highest license fees possible. So, 
relying exclusively on market mechanisms of exchange creates the danger that strategic 
exploitation of the market system can reduce aggregate welfare.
94 Id. (Externalities are ubiquitous in society, and in a wide variety of contexts, externalities are 
simultaneously valuable to society and yet irrelevant to investment decisions, or more generally, to resource 
allocation by the market.) See also David D. Haddock, Irrelevant Externality Angst (working paper on file 
with the author).
95
 Frischmann, supra note 92.
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Another potential cause of doctrinal inefficiency that deserves greater attention is 
the possibility that private ordering may reduce the diversity of information production or 
result in overly-centralized decision making architectures.96 Increases in copyright scope 
may reduce diversity by increasing the concentration of information production, or by 
concentrating too much decision making power in the hands of first generation authors.97
For example, a recent Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decision has held that any digital 
music sampling, no matter how brief, nor how unrecognizable, requires a license from the 
copyright owner.98 Under this interpretation of the law,99 artists who use a lot of music 
samples are likely to gravitate towards large labels that offer them a significant catalog of 
primary material, where they can be sure of attaining the required permissions on 
reasonable terms.  Even if this does not reduce the production of music genres such as 
hip-hop, it may tend to centralize production under the roof of the large recording studios 
that already dominate the industry, and thus potentially reduce diversity of expression
which is an important part of consumer welfare in the context of copyright. 
Similarly, very high levels of copyright scope can concentrate the power to choose 
the direction of new technology in undesirable ways. Digital music technology illustrates 
this problem.100 If copyright scope were much greater than it currently is, consumers 
would be infringing the rights of copyright owners every time they transferred music from 
a CD onto a digital music player.  Digital music players such as the iPod increase the 
96
 See e.g. Yochai Benkler, Intellectual Property and the Organization of Information Production, 
22 INT’L. REV. L. & ECON. 81 (2002); Wu, supra note 36.
97 Id.
98
 Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir., 2005).  As the court so eloquently 
stated, “Get a license or do not sample.”
99
 For a thoughtful critique of the Bridgeport decision, see Sang Lee, De Minimis Taking, Digital 
Sampling, and Copyright Infringement:  A New Dissonance in Production, N.W. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2006).
100
 This example expands on Tim Wu’s general point about the decentralizing function of fair use 
in copyright law. See Wu, supra note 36.
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value of music for consumers; these devices give consumers more opportunities to enjoy 
the music they have already purchased. However, digital music players that play 
unencrypted music files (as most do) present a threat to the recording industry because 
they work equally well with music unlawfully acquired from peer-to-peer file sharing 
services. If the ordinary consumer use of the iPod constituted copyright infringement, 
then it is likely that Apple, the iPod’s manufacturer, would be liable for its customers’ 
copyright violations under the Supreme Court’s recently announced theory of “inducing 
infringement.”101 In this scenario Apple may be liable under other theories of secondary 
liability as well, assuming that any alternative uses for the iPod were judged to be 
insubstantial.
The prospects for private ordering under this scenario look bleak. Apple could 
have approached the record labels to seek their permission to develop and market the 
iPod, but it is unlikely that such permission would have been forthcoming at a reasonable 
price or at any price at all. The recording industry has substantial fixed investments in the 
physical distribution of music, and it is doubtful that it would ever have moved away from 
that model voluntarily.102 But, in point of fact, Apple did not need to seek the recording 
industry’s permission to explore this new technology because consumer copying for the 
sole purpose of space-shifting to a digital music player is fair use.103 Because space-
shifting to a digital music player is fair use, the iPod has a clearly substantial non-
infringing use and Apple’s promotion of that use does not constitute inducing 
101
 MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
102
 Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 
1999) (The recording industry’s legal challenge to the Rio portable MP3 player unsuccessful. Space-shifting 
found to be “paradigmatic noncommercial personal use.”)
103
 There is no case directly on point to this effect, but it seems to be an inexorable conclusion 
based on the Supreme Court’s holding in Sony that time-shifting broadcast television is a fair use, Sony, 464 
U.S. at 423; the dicta of the Ninth Circuit in A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir. 
2001) and Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999).
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infringement. As illustrated, the operation of the fair use doctrine reduces the scope of the 
recording industry’s copyrights and decentralizes decision making power in relation to 
new technologies in ways that can promote social welfare. 
For the reasons given above, market optimism appears to be questionable in some 
contexts, but there is also a large degree of efficient private ordering that cannot be simply 
ignored. We should expect private ordering through licensing and the formation of firms 
to significantly reduce the negative welfare consequences of increasing copyright scope, 
but only up to a point. Figure 2 shows the welfare effects of copyright scope as initially 
depicted in Figure 1 (represented as a dashed line) but revised to take account of the 
mitigating effects of private ordering that is somewhat, but not perfectly efficient 
(represented by the solid line).  As illustrated, if we reject a strong version of market 
optimism, the negative effects of an increase in copyright scope can be mitigated by 
private ordering, but not entirely erased.  At the extreme level of copyright scope (S ), the 
welfare effect of copyright falls to zero.  In this bleak and purely hypothetical scenario:
there is no fair use, all ideas are subject to copyright, and even the makers of typewriters 
are liable for contributing to or inducing copyright infringement.  Obviously, S does not 
represent any level of copyright scope that is likely to occur, even if copyright was 
rewritten according to the desires of copyright interests such as the entertainment 
industry. 
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As Figure 2 illustrates, private ordering through both the market and the firm 
increases the level of copyright scope at which welfare is maximized (from S* to S`), but 
it does not change the fundamental relationship between copyright scope and welfare. The 
curve depicting the relationship is still convex; there is still a point, S**, at which any 
increase in copyright scope will reduce w elfare below its maximum, W`.
Stage 3: Recognizing indeterminacy
None of this answers the question of whether the current level of copyright scope 
is more or less than S`. Empirical research on the efficiency of licensing and the 
consolidation of information production into firms has the potential to shed some light on 
this question, but it is unlikely to ever be conclusive.  Different views of the benefits or 
detriments of a further extension of copyright scope can be attributed either to different 
assessments of the relationship between copyright scope and w elfare, or merely to 
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different assessments of the status quo, or different views regarding the effectiveness of 
market reallocation. A copyright pessimist is likely to view the relationship as positively 
skewed, such that most of the benefits of copyright protection come from fairly low levels 
of protection.  In contrast, a copyright optimist is likely to view the relationship as 
negatively skewed, such that it is not until copyright scope is very broad that the 
maximum benefits of copyright are seen. Figure 3 illustrates three possible relationships 
between welfare and copyright scope, drawn from the perspectives ranging from less to 
more optimistic (pessimist (CP), neutral (CN) and optimist (CO)).  












Consider the move from S1 to S2, where S1 represents the current level of 
copyright scope and S2 represents a proposed increase.  The shift from S1 to S2 is welfare 
negative on the CP curve because welfare declines from W1 to W3.  On the CN curve, the 
shift from S1 to S2 is welfare neutral, although a move from S1 to any point between S1
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and S2 would be welfare enhancing.  On the CO curve, the shift from S1 to S2 is welfare 
improving because welfare increases from W2 to W1.
The three curves in Figure 3 represent three different sets of assumptions about the 
relationship between copyright scope and welfare and varying degrees of optimism about 
the effect of an increase in copyright scope. However, they could equally represent the 
varying effects of copyright across three different industries.  Returning to the earlier 
example of the Bridgeport decision, a blanket prohibition on unlicensed digital sampling 
is likely to modestly increase the incentives for music production in general, but it would 
also significantly raise the costs of producing certain types of music, such as hip-hop.
Alternatively, it may be the case that folk musicians with a tradition of reinterpreting past 
works have lower fixed costs, require lower monetary rewards, but experience higher 
intrinsic rewards from production than pop singers in the mold of Britney Spears. Given 
those assumptions, folk singers would be best served by fairly low levels of copyright 
scope and are potentially adversely affected by even small increases in costs and 
uncertainty associated with higher levels of scope.
This leads to another significant consideration: even if it is established that an 
increase in copyright scope would do more harm than good in one industry, we have no 
present basis on which to generalize that finding to other industries.104 In Figure 3 if we 
view CO, CN and CP, not as different views of the scope-welfare relationship in a given 
market, but rather as the scope-welfare relationship in three different markets, it is clear 
that increasing copyright scope might simultaneously increase welfare in relation to one 
sector of the economy, while reducing it in another.
104
 Dan Burk and Mark Lemley discuss a similar problem with respect to industry variation in 
patent law. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1578 
(2003) (finding that economic evidence, patent doctrine, and legal theory, all vary by industry).
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C. Doctrinal Efficiency 
Existing scholarship questioning the scope of tends to focus on either the public 
good nature of information or the positive externalities which result from information 
production.105 In contrast, this article highlights the relationship between copyright scope 
and doctrinal efficiency.  As noted in the introduction, much of the existing copyright 
literature is devoted to illustrating the potential excesses of copyright and proposing 
various doctrinal levers to remedy those excesses.106 Understanding the relationship 
between copyright scope and welfare is an important part of those endeavors, but it is not 
complete without an appreciation of doctrinal efficiency. 
In evaluating specific doctrinal recommendations, we need to assess both the 
effect on copyright scope in general and the specific costs and benefits of the doctrinal 
formulation in particular. From this perspective, it is simplistic to assume that all possible 
compositions of copyright scope have the same effect on the author’s expected reward, 
the author’s cost of expression and the administrative costs of the copyright system.107 As 
discussed in the previous section, the traditional economic analysis of copyright can be 
usefully reframed as an inquiry into the optimum level of copyright scope, as opposed to 
copyright protection (which includes both scope and duration). Although focusing on 
scope is in many ways an improvement on the traditional model, it remains 
compositionally indeterminate. Just as copyright protection is composed of both scope 
and duration; copyright scope itself represents the combined effects of numerous 
copyright doctrines: the idea-expression distinction, the test of substantial similarity, the 
105 See Part II.C, supra.
106 See, supra note 8 and accompanying text.
107
 This simplifying assumption is perfectly reasonable in the context of Landes and Posner’s 
original work which focused on the economic efficiency of the copyright system as a whole. See Landes & 
Posner, supra note 35, at 325. 
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fair use doctrine, secondary liability, and anti-circumvention liability under the DMCA.108
Consequently, any assessment of the optimum level of scope will also be doctrinally 
indeterminate, as it too could be achieved through a theoretically infinite number of 
combinations of its various components.109
The compositional indeterminacy of copyright scope means that economic 
analysis of copyright doctrines must consider both the optimal level of copyright scope 
and the efficiency of individual doctrines.  Even if one regards economic efficiency as the 
sole motivation for copyright doctrines,110 it is nonetheless apparent that copyright 
doctrines are only approximations for the efficiency concerns embedded within the law.  
Furthermore, the flexibility of individual doctrines is limited by the need to establish tests 
that are capable of observation and prediction by the public and application by the courts. 
There is no easy solution to interdependence of optimum copyright scope and 
optimum doctrinal composition, but it is clear that some comparison of doctrinal 
efficiency effects with the possible welfare gains of changing the level of copyright scope 
is necessary.  One measure of the efficiency of individual doctrines is the disparity 
between the positive incentive effects of marginal increases in copyright scope and the 
associated increased costs to potential second generation authors. Put simply, the 
efficiency of an individual copyright doctrine is determined by the extent that a change in 
scope it benefits first generation authors more than its costs second generation authors for 
a given level of copyright scope.  
108 See notes 41 to 45 and accompanying text.
109
 Landes and Posner hint at the problem of compositional indeterminacy, but they do not pursue 
its conclusions beyond noting that “[t]he more the cost of expression rises as [Z] increases… the lower will 
be the optimal degree of copyright protection.” Landes & Posner, supra note 35, at 344.
110
 For a contrary point of view see, Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 
GEO. L.J. 287 (1988). See also Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright , 83 TEX. L. 
REV. 1535 (2005).
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The abstract scope/welfare curves in the previous sections are all drawn assuming 
that any given level of scope is achieved in the most efficient way possible, i.e. with the 
least costly combination of doctrinal settings. That assumption is useful for developing 
intuitions about the relationship between copyright scope and welfare in general, but it 
must be abandoned to evaluate the logic of particular doctrinal questions.
Again, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Grokster illustrates the importance 
of doctrinal efficiency. In that case, the representatives of the copyright owners and their 
supporting amici argued that the practical scope of copyright protection for sound 
recordings had been reduced by widespread unauthorized peer-to-peer file sharing. 
Assuming that much is true, it is nonetheless debatable whether society as a whole would 
be better off with an expansion of the copyright owners’ formal legal rights, and more 
importantly which form of expansion would be most desirable. 
In Grokster, the entertainment industry urged the Court compare the ratio of 
infringing and non-infringing uses of a product or service and hold that “a defendant 
should be liable whenever infringement is the principal or primary use.”111 Lawyers for 
the entertainment industry argued that “where the primary use is infringement, the 
defendant is fairly said to be in the business of infringement, not substantially unrelated
commerce. Holding the purveyor of such an infringement-driven service responsible 
forces that business to internalize the costs of infringement and is consistent with 
traditional tort and copyright principles placing liability on gatekeepers who can most 
effectively stop infringement.”112
111
 MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., Reply Brief For Motion Picture Studio And Recording 
Company Petitioners, 2004 U.S. Briefs 480, 8 (U.S. S. Ct. Briefs 2005)
112 Id.
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In a similar vein, several amicus briefs urged the Court to adopt a narrow reading 
of its earlier decision in Sony and apply a comprehensive balancing test of the relative 
harms and benefits associated with dual-use technologies to delineate the boundaries of 
secondary liability.113 The Menell Amicus Brief proposes an eight factor that courts 
should consider in this regard: (1) the knowledge possessed by the defendants about 
infringing use; (2) the extent to which aspects of the product or service were designed 
purposefully and without functional advantages to evade liability; (3) whether non-
infringing uses can be achieved for most consumers through other means without 
significant added expense, inconvenience, or loss of functionality; (4) the extent to which 
copyright owners can protect themselves against such infringements without undue cost 
(e.g., through self-help mechanisms such as encryption); (5) the extent to which 
infringement affects only a limited number of works; (6) the cost and efficacy of 
enforcement against direct infringers; (7) the extent to which the plaintiffs seek to expand 
unduly the scope of their copyrights for purposes of controlling new markets, as opposed 
to protecting their copyrighted works (copyright misuse); and (8) the impacts of potential 
remedies on both infringing and non-infringing uses.114
The Arrow Brief demonstrates a similar enthusiasm for judicially administrated 
balancing tests. Its primary concern is that the rules of secondary liability should give 
technology manufacturers the appropriate incentive to deter infringement “in instances 
where deterrence could be accomplished at low cost and without any significant 
113
 MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., Brief of Amici Curie Peter S. Menell et al in Support of 
Petitioners, 2004 U.S. Briefs 480, 24 (U.S. S. Ct. Briefs 2005)
114 Id. at 26 –28.
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interference with non-infringing uses.”115 Arrow and his fellow amici urged the Supreme 
Court to dismantle the Sony safe harbor of substantial non-infringing use. They argue that 
technology providers whose products have substantial non-infringing uses will have no 
incentive to make their products less harmful to copyright owners under that approach.116
The Arrow Brief urged the Court to consider both the good faith of the technology 
developers and the extent to which “reasonable modifications to the relevant technology 
could reduce the number of infringing acts without substantially interfering with non-
infringing uses.”117 Adding an even greater degree of judicial over-sight, the amici also 
suggest that courts should consider whether the non-infringing uses of the technology 
could be achieved with existing or alternative technology.118
The various balancing tests proposed in relation to secondary liability create a 
vague and uncertain standard that amounts to an open-ended duty to modify product 
design. The costs of this uncertain approach are likely to be significant in the context of 
technology development because inventors and entrepreneurs in the present day have no 
way of knowing what a court will make of their infringement mitigation attempts by the 
time their case goes to trial. Courts face substantial information costs in second guessing 
complex engineering and business decisions. Consequently technology developers need to 
factor in not only their own uncertainties but also the significant likelihood of judicial 
error. This is a perilous climate for investment in innovation. 
115
 MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., Brief of Amici Curiae Kenneth J. Arrow et al in Support 
Of Petitioners, 2004 U.S. Briefs 480, 3 (U.S. S. Ct. Briefs 2005). 
116 Id. at 9.
117 Id. at 10- 11. (Arguing that firms responsible for promulgating peer-to-peer technology should 
undertake good faith efforts toward identifying and implementing plausible low-cost mechanisms that might 
discourage infringement.) 
118 Id. at 13.
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Furthermore, by urging courts to consider complex factual questions relating to 
the technology developer’s good faith and the reasonableness of modifications, the 
balancing tests proposed above open the door wide ranging discovery and protracted 
litigation. The strategic use of litigation facilitated by standards that do not lend 
themselves to summary judgment would caste an even darker shadow over the garages 
and boardrooms of Silicon Valley.119 A balancing test for secondary liability is only 
efficient in an abstract world of perfect and swift adjudication. In the real world it has 
little to commend it. More importantly, as the Supreme Court recognized, adopting an 
open-ended duty to modify product design was not the only way to expand the scope of 
copyright in relation to file sharing. Rather than modifying Sony’s protection for duel-use 
technology, the Court increased the protection of the entertainment industry by applying 
the doctrine of “inducing infringement” to the facts at issue. 
In Grokster, the Supreme Court unanimously concluded that:
one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe 
copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster 
infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.120
The Court found that there was “unmistakable evidence” that the defendants had taken 
active steps to induce copyright infringement on their network – based primarily on the 
defendants’ aim to satisfy a known source of demand for copyright infringement (former 
Napster users).121
119 See, MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2792-2793 (U.S. 2005) (Warning 
that requiring defendants to provide detailed evidence would “increase the legal uncertainty that surrounds 
the creation or development of a new technology capable of being put to infringing uses. Inventors and 
entrepreneurs (in the garage, the dorm room, the corporate lab, or the boardroom) would have to fear (and in 
many cases endure) costly and extensive trials when they create, produce, or distribute the sort of 
information technology that can be used for copyright infringement.)
120 Id. at 2770.
121
 For example, Streamcast had promoted itself as the “#1 alternative to Napster” and enticed 
former Napster users with messages such as “Napster Inc. has announced that it will soon begin charging 
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The Court reinforced its conclusion by pointing to the defendants’ failure to 
attempt to develop filtering tools or other mechanisms to diminish the infringing activity 
using their software and the significance of infringing activity to sustaining the their 
respective business models.122  But it is important to note that “in the absence of other 
evidence of intent, a court would be unable to find contributory infringement liability 
merely based on a failure to take affirmative steps to prevent infringement, if the device 
otherwise was capable of substantial noninfringing uses.”123  Furthermore, the Court 
cautioned that the evidence of a link between infringing uses and profitability alone 
would not “justify an inference of unlawful intent,” but that “viewed in the context of the 
entire record its import [was] clear.”124
The inducing infringement doctrine may not possess the same abstract potential 
for optimization as the balancing tests advocated by the entertainment industry and its 
supporting amici. However, it is not encumbered by its many drawbacks either. Inducing 
infringement makes technology developers liable for “affirmative steps” and “clear 
expression” that fosters third party copyright infringement. Technology developers who 
are careful to stress the appropriate uses of their products and who meet the threshold of 
substantial non-infringing use are left free to make their own design choices without fear 
of interference by copyright owners or second guessing by the courts. 
In sum, As Grokster illustrates, individual doctrinal questions can only be
determined by considering both copyright scope and comparative doctrinal efficiency. 
you a fee. That's if the courts don't order it shut down first. What will you do to get around it?” Id. at 2773. 
Grokster’s intention was manifest in the derivation of its names (a weak argument) and its practice of 
encoding its web site with meta-tags "Napster" and "free filesharing." Id.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 2781, n.12.
124 Id. at 2782.
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Expecting judges to precisely calibrate copyright scope is unrealistic in most cases, in 
contrast, the experience of judges administering the common law is likely to give them at 
least a broad intuitive grasp of the trade-offs involved in assessing doctrinal efficiency. 
The foregoing analysis also indicates that improving doctrinal efficiency without
reference to optimum copyright scope may be justified in some cases. If the resulting 
changes in scope are thought to be small, the welfare benefits of improving doctrinal 
efficiency will probably exceed the possible costs of moving scope in the wrong direction. 
For example, the application of the fair use doctrine could be greatly improved through a 
codification of certain safe-harbors already recognized in the common law.  Doctrinal 
rules are least efficient when they increase transaction costs and uncertainty, or where 
they impede market solutions.  Mitigating this inefficiency is a feasible use of law and 
economics, probably more feasible than finding the optimal level of copyright protection 
or even the optimal level of copyright scope.
D. Applying the Copyright Scope and Doctrinal Efficiency Framework  
The forgoing discussion can be reduced to four conclusions, three of which in turn 
provide useful metrics to assess a variety of specific doctrinal recommendations in 
copyright law. First, it can be said with a high degree of confidence that a level of 
copyright scope that approaches either zero or infinity will be sub-optimal.125 By itself 
this does not serve as a useful benchmark, but it is an important foundational point.  The 
normative implications of this conclusion depend on one’s own assessment of where the 
current scope of copyright lies along that spectrum. The current scope of copyright is 
125
 Clearly, this is by no means the first article on copyright to reach this conclusion, nor is it likely 
to be the last. See, e.g., Lessig, Intellectual Property and Code, supra note 5, at 638; Cohen, supra note 5, at 
514. 
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clearly less than S, but whether it is more or less than the optimum remains an open 
question. In formal terms copyright scope today is undoubtedly high compared to any 
other period of history.126  But in practical terms, the effective scope of copyright may be 
at an all time low because of the digitization of content and advances in copying 
technology. 127
The second conclusion is that the net welfare effects of a change in copyright 
scope are dependant on the efficiency of private ordering.  The more efficiently the 
market reallocates rights through licensing or the consolidation of production into firms, 
the higher the optimum level of copyright scope will be. If the scope-welfare function is 
convex, not only is the efficiency of private ordering likely to vary generally, but the 
degree of efficiency required to justify an increase in copyright scope on welfare grounds 
increases with the level of copyright scope. Thus the higher the existing level of copyright 
scope is, the more efficient private ordering must be to sustain yet further increases. 
The third conclusion is that the compositional indeterminacy of copyright scope 
(and copyright protection more generally) means that economic analysis of copyright 
doctrines must consider both the optimal level of copyright scope and the effect of
different doctrinal compositions of copyright scope.  Doctrinal recommendations that 
focus on optimizing the scope of copyright in the abstract but do not account for the effect 
of a proposed doctrinal change on transaction costs, uncertainty or strategic behavior are 
necessarily incomplete. 
126 LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 1, at 7-8, 141-44.
127
 Landes & Posner, supra note 35, at 84.  But note that copyright scope has also increased 
because of the same technological forces. In particular because the use of a copyrighted digital work also 
necessitates copying that work into a computer’s random access memory. See, MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak 
Computer, 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993).
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The fourth conclusion that can be drawn from the forgoing models of the welfare 
effects of copyright scope is that determining the net welfare effects of any given change 
in copyright doctrine is extremely difficult. Even if a cost-benefit analysis of the welfare 
effects of a change in copyright scope with respect to one particular group was clear, the 
net welfare effect across all affected groups remains uncertain. It would be difficult to say 
prospectively whether a change in the law that made Hollywood blockbusters less 
profitable but expanded the freedom of independent film makers was a net positive,
especially because each provides the infrastructure for the other in some fashion. 
Empirical evidence of the effect of changes in copyright scope has the potential to further 
clarify the nature of the welfare-scope relationship, but subject to both inter- and intra-
industry variation.
The welfare-scope relationship is both complicated and subject to substantial 
variation, both within and between industries.  Doctrinal recommendations which simply 
assume that the welfare effects of a change in copyright scope are easily ascertainable are 
likely to be far too simplistic. Even where data is available, it will be open to competing 
explanations and extrapolations. Furthermore, advocates of industry focused tailoring 
solutions must consider whether intra-industry variation might not be just as significant as 
the inter-industry variation they seek to design policy around.
In summary, the insights offered by the analysis of copyright scope and doctrinal 
efficiency in this article go well beyond the mere assertion that infinite copyright is 
undesirable (although that is an important starting point). In particular, the forgoing 
analysis has established that:
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(1) The efficiency of private ordering is the key determinant of the ideal level 
of copyright scope.
(2) The welfare-scope relationship is both complicated and subject to 
substantial variation, both within and between industries. 
(3) Doctrinal recommendations that focus on optimizing the scope of 
copyright in the abstract but do not account for the effect of a doctrinal 
change on transaction costs or uncertainty are necessarily incomplete.  
Using these conclusions as metrics for assessing doctrinal proposals makes the transition 
from abstract economics to practical application possible. Part III which follows 
demonstrates the application of these metrics in the context of a critical evaluation of the 
primary law and economics approaches to copyright’s fair use doctrine. 
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PART III – APPLICATION TO FAIR USE 
This part builds on the framework developed in Part II  by assessing  the 
predominant law and economics approaches to copyright’s fair use doctrine in light of the 
conclusions reached in relation to copyright scope and doctrinal efficiency.  The 
conclusions from the previous part can be restated as metrics or benchmarks for analyzing 
a doctrinal theory as follows:128
(1) Does the theory take account of the role of private ordering in determining 
the ideal scope of copyright?
(2) Is the theory doctrinally efficient?
(3) Is the theory feasible in light of the expectation that there will be 
substantial variation, both within and between industries, in the welfare-
scope relationship?
By applying these metrics for assessing doctrinal proposals, this article illustrates 
how the gap between the traditional law and economics of copyright and specific 
doctrinal analysis can be bridged.  The development and application of these metrics does 
not definitively determine which doctrinal proposals are either efficient or normatively 
desirable, but it makes a contribution by filtering out some ill-conceived 
recommendations, and by identifying areas for improvement in others.  The analysis that 
follows is devoted to the traditionally “troublesome” doctrine of fair use,129 but the 
metrics developed in this article can be applied to wide range of doctrinal 
recommendations in copyright.
128
 The metrics have been reordered to suit the application that follows.
129 See Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2nd Cir. 1939).
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The two primary law and economics contributions to the fair use doctrine, the 
market failure test and the application of a cost-benefit analysis present a puzzling 
contradiction. Resting on an initial presumption of efficient private ordering, the market 
failure approach places a heavy burden on defendants to establish fair use. 130  In contrast, 
the cost-benefit approach manifests a deep pessimism in the capacity of market 
institutions to provide the kind of flexibility that the users of copyrighted works require, 
and tilts the scales heavily in favor of fair use.131 These approaches share a common 
foundation in law and economics, and yet they reach very different conclusions as to how 
judges should apply the fair use doctrine.  
Part III.A. outlines the basic features of both the market failure theory of fair use 
and the cost-benefit approach. Part III.B. explores the strengths and weaknesses of the 
market failure theory in relation to the three metrics of private ordering, doctrinal 
efficiency and variation. Part III.C. then undertakes the same analysis with respect to the 
cost-benefit approach to fair use. Finally, Part III.D. revisits both theories in light of this 
analysis and reviews the primary insights derived. 
130
 Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the 
Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982) [hereinafter, Gordon, Fair Use as 
Market Failure]. Gordon proposed a three part test as follows: “Fair use should be awarded to the defendant 
in a copyright infringement action when (1) market failure is present; (2) transfer of the use to defendant is 
socially desirable; and (3) an award of fair use would not cause substantial injury to the incentives of the 
plaintiff copyright owner.” Id. at 1614.
131
 Variations of a cost-benefit analysis of fair use have been proposed by a number of scholars, 
most comprehensively by William Fisher and Glynn Lunney. See William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing 
The Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1661 (1988); Glynn S. Lunney, Fair Use and Market Failure: 
Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. REV. 975 (2002). See infra part III.C.
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A. Law and Economics Theories of Fair Use 
1. Fair Use as Market Failure 
Since it was first articulated by Wendy Gordon over twenty years ago,132 the 
concept of fair use as market failure has been controversial,133 and arguably 
misunderstood.134 Nonetheless its influence is undeniable.135 The essential logic of the 
fair use as market failure paradigm is that strong property rights facilitate an efficient 
market in the exploitation of creative works, but that on occasions where that market fails, 
exceptions to strong property rights in the form of fair use have to be made.136
Applications of Gordon’s market failure framework have largely concentrated on 
the role of transaction costs in justifying fair use. 137 However, it is important to note at 
the outset that Gordon’s initial formulation also addressed other potential causes of 
market failure, including externalities and “non-economic motivations.”138  Gordon’s 
original test for applying fair use required the defendant to establish three things: (1) the 
132
 Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 130, at 1653-54.
133
 See for example: Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Consumers and Creative Destruction: Fair Use 
Beyond Market Failure, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 539 (2003); Lunney, supra note 131; Robert P. Merges, 
The End of Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the “Newtonian” World of On-Line Commerce, 12 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115, 130-34 (1997); and Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining The Market Failure 
Approach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (1997).
134
 According to Gordon herself. See Gordon, Market Failure and Intellectual Property: A 
Response To Professor Lunney. 82 B.U. L. REV. 1031 [hereinafter, Gordon, Market Failure and Intellectual 
Property]. See also Merges, supra note 133, at 130.
135
 Gordon’s Fair Use as Market Failure has been cited with approval by the Supreme Court in 
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 478 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); 
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985) (O’Connor, J., per 
curium); and by the Second Circuit in Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 115 (2d Cir. 
1998); by the Seventh Circuit in Ty, Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l, 292 F.3d 512, 517 (7th Cir. 2002); by the Ninth 
Circuit in Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986) and Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia 
Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1119 (9th Cir. 2000); In addition, Gordon’s Fair Use as Market 
Failure was clearly influential in the Second Circuit’s decision in Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 
F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994).
136 See Robert P. Merges, Are You Making Fun of Me? Notes on Market Failure and the Parody 
Defense in Copyright, 21 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS'N Q.J. 305, 307 (1993) (noting that deviations from a 
presumption against fair use “must be pleaded with special facts, and convincingly”).
137
 The term ‘transaction cost’ broadly refers to any cost incurred in relation to an economic 
exchange. See Tirole, supra note 48, at 29. 
138
 Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 130.
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presence of market failure; (2) the social desirability of allowing the defendant’s 
unauthorized use to continue; and (3) that finding fair use would not cause substantial 
injury to the incentives of the copyright owner.139
There have been many attempts to apply fair use as market failure to extrapolate 
an efficient application of the fair use doctrine in particular situations. For example, 
Landes and Posner reframe the fair use status of parody in terms of a failure in the market 
for permission to criticize in the form of a derivative work.140 A failure of the market for 
permission to parody appears inevitable, since it would be unrealistic to expect authors to 
voluntarily allow themselves to be criticized.141 Although this is a convincing 
explanation, it fails to identify exactly why the author’s subjective value in not being 
ridiculed should not be fully represented.142 As Alfred Yen argues, the idea that parody 
represents a market failure rests on a value judgment that the author’s anti-dissemination 
motives should be given less respect than other preferences.143 As a matter of copyright 
doctrine, this is fairly easy to explain. Copyright does not exist for the benefit of 
individual authors, but rather for the promotion of the progress of science and the useful 
arts.144  Given that rationale, a bias towards dissemination seems obvious. But, from an 
abstract utility maximizing perspective, it is hard to see why we should not be completely 
139 Id., at 6014. Note that Gordon no longer holds to the third element of her proposed test. See 
Gordon, Intellectual Property and Market Failure, supra note 134, at 1034-35.
140
 Landes & Posner, supra note 35, at 359-60.
141
 As the Supreme Court notes in Campbell, “People ask for criticism, but they only want praise.” 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994) (quoting from S. Maugham, Of Human Bondage 
241 (Penguin ed. 1992)).
142
 See, Alfred C. Yen, When Authors Won't Sell: Parody, Fair Use and Efficiency in Copyright 
Law, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 79 (1991).
143 Id.
144
 U.S. Const. Art 8.
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neutral about an author’s desire to suppress information. In which case, anti-
dissemination motives are not a source of market failure.145
Landes and Posner also regard quotation and reference in the service of review 
and criticism more generally as justified under a market failure approach.146 The authors 
argue that if reviews depended on consent, they would lose credibility with the public and 
therefore be less valuable to both authors and the public.147 Consequently, the benefits of 
a no-consent rule to authors as a class outweigh the individual interests of those authors 
who get bad reviews. From a game theory perspective, this can be framed as a simple 
coordination problem. However, applying the logic of Merges’ Contracting Into Liability 
Rules to the problem of reviews,148 one might ask why we should not simply rely on the 
emergence of market mechanisms to overcome such problems. If authors as a class really 
benefit from reviews, they should find some contractual mechanism to enable them to 
pre-commit to allowing reviews.149
Furthermore, in response to the recent extension of copyright duration by the 
CTEA,150 a number of authors have suggested that courts should adjust the scope of 
copyright protection to account for the passage of time by expressly considering time as a 
factor in fair use analysis.151 Joseph Liu argues that as a work becomes older, the ability 
of the author to prevent re-use, criticism, transformation, and adaptation of that work 
should diminish, i.e. “fair use should be greater for Mickey Mouse than for Harry 
145
 Yen, supra note 142, at 79.
146
 Landes & Posner, supra note 35, at 358.
147 Id. at 359.
148 See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
149
 Reasons why this may not be the case are addressed below, see infra note 185 and 
accompanying text. 
150 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
151
 Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409 (2002).
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Potter.”152 Richard Posner and William Patry present a proposal that is similar, but more 
clearly framed within the market failure paradigm. They suggest that the problem of 
obtaining licenses to reproduce old works of limited commercial value also merits fair 
use.153
2. A Cost-Benefit Approach to Fair Use 
In the course of his epic reconstruction of the fair use doctrine, William Fisher 
proposes an altogether different law and economics based approach to resolving fair use 
cases. Fisher suggests that fair use cases should be determined through a detailed 
examination of the costs and benefits of the incentives and impositions resulting from 
competing uses of any given work.154 The “cost” of allowing fair use is the notional 
reduction in the copyright owner’s incentives compared to what they might have been, 
had fair use not been allowed. The copyright owner’s potential incentives in this 
calculation include any licensing revenue she could have extracted from the defendant or 
any similarly situated persons.155 The “benefit” of allowing fair use is that the defendant 
is neither denied the use of the work, nor is she forced to pay the copyright owner for that 
use.  Again, this includes not just the actual defendant, but also all similarly situated 
potential defendants.156
152 Id. at 410. See also Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REV. 775 (2003) (stating 
that fewer unauthorized uses should be fair uses in the first years or decades of a copyright term, and more 
and more unauthorized uses should be deemed fair as a work grows older).
153
 Richard Posner & William Patry, Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the Wake of Eldred, 92 
CAL. L. REV. 1639 (2004).
154
 Fisher, supra note 131.  A cost-benefit analysis is also the second limb of Gordon’s test, once 
the initial screen of market failure has been satisfied. Although Gordon’s formulation is slightly different, in 
that she would determine whether allowing fair use was socially beneficial by asking whether “when the 
“market failure” were cured, the price that the owner would demand is lower than the price that the user 
would offer.” Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 130, at 1614. 
155
 Fisher, supra note 131, at 1699.
156 Id.
MATTHEW J. SAG COPYRIGHT SCOPE AND DOCTRINAL EFFICIENCY  DRAFT  3/23/06 
54
The idea of resolving fair use decisions through a cost-benefit analysis is simple to 
state, but difficult to apply. Under Fisher’s approach, a judge would have to catalog every 
conceivable type of use of a work, ranging from reprints to action figures and beyond, 
then to determine the value of each potential use, rank them, and weigh them against the 
range of costs to the current and other future possible defendants.157
Glynn Lunney offers another version of a cost benefit analysis for fair use .158
Lunney urges courts to regard the four statutory factors as historically dated “proxies for 
the balance of competing public interests” and adopt a more general cost-benefit approach 
to the fair use.159 Similar to Fisher, Lunney argues that, “[i]n an ideal world with perfect 
information, courts could resolve the fair use issue by determining precisely the social 
value of additional authorship resulting from prohibiting a use and then comparing that 
value to the social value of allowing the use to continue.”160  What is striking about this 
formulation is that it suggests that the ideal resolution of fair use cases rests literally on a 
case-by-case analysis. Whether this is what Lunney actually intended, or merely a 
paradigmatic extrapolation, is unclear. Accordingly, the application of the metrics that 
follows considers a cost-benefit analysis applied on a purely case by case level, a highly 
specified level that required a new cost-benefit analysis for all but the narrowest of factual 
classes, and a cost-benefit analysis applied at a much broader industry level. 
157 Id.
158
 Lunney, supra note 131, at 1023.
159 Id. at 998.
160 Id.
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B. Applying the Doctrinal Metrics to the Market Failure Theory 
1. The Efficiency of Private Ordering 
The first test of any law and economics based doctrinal recommendation should be 
whether it takes account of the relationship between the ideal level of copyright scope and 
the efficiency of private ordering. Prima facie, the market failure approach to fair use 
would seem to pass this test with flying colors, but a more detailed analysis suggests some 
grounds for qualification. Although the market failure test for fair use is appropriately 
focused on the central question of whether the market is working or not, the mechanics of 
the test are loaded significantly in favor of false positives, i.e., of concluding that the 
market is working when in fact it is not.161 In particular, the requirement that the 
defendant prove the existence of market failure as a prerequisite for a finding of fair 
use162 tilts this apparently neutral framework decidedly in favor of the copyright owner. 
The allocation of the burden of proof in fair use cases is extremely important 
because of the difficulty of actually proving that a market is or is not working.  The 
Supreme Court’s Sony  decision illustrates an evidentiary stalemate typical of fair cases: 
the movie studios were unable to establish that time-shifting actually resulted in an 
adverse market effect, but nor could Sony establish that such an effect would not occur in 
the future.163 Ultimately, the case turned on the majority’s presumption that non-
commercial uses were fair uses.164 Transaction costs, externalities and “non-market 
161
 See Wu, supra note 36 on the distinction between Type I and Type II errors and their 
comparative desirability. 
162
 Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 130, at 1614.
163
 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 424 (1984).
164 Id. at 449 (“If the Betamax were used to make copies for a commercial or profit-making 
purpose, such use would presumptively be unfair. The contrary presumption is appropriate here, however, 
because the District Court's findings plainly establish that time-shifting for private home use must be 
characterized as a noncommercial, nonprofit activity.”).
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motivations” are always present to some degree in real world markets. Consequently, 
merely identifying the existence of one or more potential causes of market failure will 
never be sufficient; the defendant (or the plaintiff) must establish that these market 
imperfections are of a sufficient degree to constitute a market failure. 
The presence of transaction costs that exceed the potential gains from trade 
between a copyright owner and a subsequent user is probably the most common 
rationalization for findings of fair use.165 The term ‘transaction cost’ broadly refers to any 
cost incurred in relation to an economic exchange.166 At a minimum, participants in the 
market for copyright permissions must (1) determine what permissions they require (2) 
locate all potential rights holders, and (3) negotiate with those rights holders over prices 
and terms. Additionally, there may also be costs to maintaining and enforcing 
agreements.167 Transaction costs are significant because they may prevent otherwise 
efficient reallocation of rights from taking place.168 For example, even though library 
users might be willing to pay a small price for permission to photocopy from text books 
and journal articles, they are probably unwilling to also bear the costs of contacting the 
relevant copyright owners and negotiating a license. If transaction costs exceed the 
potential gains from trade, the market will fail to allocate resources efficiently.169
165
 Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 130.
166
 See, supra note 137. 
167
 Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 130.
168 Id. (When the transaction costs outweigh the net benefits that the parties would otherwise 
anticipate from a transfer, then the presence of the transaction costs may block an otherwise desirable shift 
in resource use.)
169
 Note that with respect to copyright, the potential gains from trade are normally equal to the 
user’s valuation of the right to make a copy, because the good in question is nonrivalrous.  Consequently, 
where transaction costs are greater than a user’s valuation, the market will fail to allocate resources 
efficiently.  In such cases, the would-be second user can either heed the exclusive rights of the copyright 
owner and forego the activity, or she can ignore those rights and reap the benefit of that use.  Where 
transaction costs make licensing impossible, the copyright owner is neither benefited nor disadvantaged by 
unauthorized uses of a work; no matter what choice the would-be second user makes, the copyright owner 
gets nothing and loses nothing.
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Although identifying potential sources of transaction costs is relatively easy, 
proving that they are, and will remain, so significant that the market has failed, is 
considerably more difficult. Indeed, a number of authors stress that exceptions to 
copyright based on transaction costs should be granted only sparingly.170 As Rob Merges 
explains, one reason is that the presence of transaction costs creates an incentive for 
innovative market solutions that reduce transaction costs in the long term, without the 
disadvantages of judicial or government regulation.171 Merges’ analysis suggests that 
even the identification of apparent market failures in the short run does not merit limiting 
the scope of the copyright owner’s rights because, in the long run, the market itself will 
address these problems.172  A second reason often given as to why courts should not 
intervene in the face of transaction costs is that advances in technology may enable more 
efficient private ordering, by reducing transactional barriers and enabling copyright 
owners to control their works more effectively through the use of sophisticated 
permissions systems and digital rights management.173 Some scholars have even predicted
that these technological developments may obviate the need for the fair use doctrine 
entirely.174 For both these reasons, transaction cost stories are easy to tell but hard to 
prove, thus elevating the significance of the market failure test’s allocation of the burden 
of proof.
The allocation of the burden of proof onto the defendant is likely to be even more 
loaded against finding fair use where the defendant’s case relies not on transaction costs, 
170
 Merges, supra note 87. See also Landes & Posner, supra note 35, at 358.
171
 Merges, supra note 87.
172
 See id.
173 See Goldstein, supra note 2Error! Bookmark not defined., at 223-24. See Cohen, supra note 
5, for an extensive discussion of this school of thought and its limitations.
174 See, e.g., Bell, supra note 73.
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but on less tangible causes of market failure such as externalities or non-economic 
motivations. There is a significant literature criticizing narrow applications of the market 
failure approach for their failure to account for externalities, which does not need to be 
repeated here.175  The problem for a defendant seeking to prove market failure (or for a 
plaintiff seeking to disprove it) is that the market failure approach itself gives little
guidance as to what degree of positive externalities or non-economic motivations might 
justify the application of fair use.  For example, it might be true that billionaire 
industrialist Howard Hughes bought up all the copyrights in magazine stories chronicling 
his life in an attempt to suppress that information.176  But without a mechanism to value 
Hughes’ interests differently to his own subjective valuation (as measured by his 
willingness to pay, and presumed unwillingness to license), simply describing the 
copyright owner’s motives as “non-economic” is not analytically useful by itself.177
Labeling someone as “irrational” does not amount to a systemic analysis of the 
efficiency of private ordering. From the perspective of law and economics, a better 
approach to assessing the efficiency of private ordering in such cases would be to rely on 
the insights of the literature on game theory or behavioral economics to identify scenarios 
where the market is likely to fail. Perhaps the most prominent application of game theory 
analysis in the intellectual property literature is Michael Heller’s “anticommons 
theory.”178 Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg have suggested that unlike the familiar “tragedy 
175 See, e.g., Loren, supra note 133; Lemley, The Economics of Improvement, supra note 5; and 
Cohen, supra note 5. 
176
 Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 311-12 (2d Cir. 1966).
177
 This is similar to Yen’s point about parody. See Yen, supra note 142.
178
 Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to 
Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 675 (1998). This is not actually an intellectual property piece but much of 
its subsequent application has been in intellectual property.  See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. 
Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698 (1998) 
(anticommons theory applied to patents on gene fragments and other biological materials).
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of the commons” which leads to over-use of a scarce resource,179 in some circumstances 
fragmented ownership of upstream rights can lead to an anticommons, the under-use of a 
valuable resource.180  In the biotechnology context, Heller and Eisenberg argue that the 
availability of patents on gene fragments threatens to create an anticommons, thus stifling 
the process of drug discovery.181  As the authors explain, the increasing patentability of 
gene fragments known as ESTs (expressed sequence tags),182 means that any one 
downstream company seeking to develop a commercial end-product must negotiate with a 
multitude of upstream rights holders, any one of whom has the power to hold up the 
product.183
Ben Depoorter and Francesco Parisi have developed a price theory explanation of 
fair use which suggests that courts should take into account: (i) the number of copyright 
holders; (ii) the degree of complementarity between the copyrighted inputs; and (iii) the 
degree of independence between the various copyright holders.184  Additional factors 
courts should also take into account include: (iv) the second generation author’s degree of 
uncertainty as to the value of any one input or the value of the final product; (v) the extent 
to which potential hold- up problems would unduly deter second generation authors; and 
179
 See Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968).
180
 Heller, supra note 178, at 624.
181
 Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 178 (stating that a proliferation of intellectual property rights 
upstream may be stifling life-saving innovations further downstream in the course of research and product 
development).
182
 An Expressed Sequence Tag is a tiny portion of an entire gene that can be used to help identify 
unknown genes and to map their positions within a genome. See National Center for Biotechnology 
Information, A Basic Introduction to the Science Underlying NCBI Resources, available at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/About/primer/est.html.
183
 This is especially problematic in the context of royalty stacking and reach-through license 
provisions. See Robin C. Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for Patent Misuse, 55 HASTINGS 
L.J. 399, 442 (noting that NIH guidelines strongly discourage the use of Reach-Through Royalties).
184
 Ben Depoorter & Francesco Parisi, Fair Use and Copyright Protection: A Price Theory 
Explanation, 21 INT'L REV. L & ECON. 453 (2002) (concluding that “viewed in light of the anticommons 
theory, fair use doctrines retain a valid efficiency justification even in a zero transaction cost 
environment.”). 
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(vi) whether transactions are too heterogeneous to allow market based solutions to 
develop.
These factors can in turn be incorporated into the common law doctrine of fair use 
and provide a more discriminating basis for determining the allocation of the burden of 
establishing whether the market is working or not. Returning to the application of fair use 
to criticism, quotation and review, it seems unlikely that market driven opt-in mechanisms 
would develop given that authors, sensitivity to criticism, expectation of criticism and 
countervailing desire for publicity are all heterogeneous.185
In addition to considerations arising from game theory and behavioral economics, 
some of the recent literature on industrial organization and intellectual property may also 
identify situations in which the consequences of market failure will be most severe, and 
therefore where an over-inclusive fair use standard is preferable to an under-inclusive 
formulation.186 As discussed in Part II.B., the fair use doctrine limits the scope of 
copyright so as to decentralize decision making in relation to technology development and 
allow for greater competition.187
In summary, the market failure approach to fair use does take account of the role 
of private ordering in determining the optimum scope of the copyright owner’s rights. 
However, a more nuanced approach to determining whether it is the defendant or the 
plaintiff carries the burden in relation to market failure would improve the approach.
185
 Another is that reviews uncompromised by the author’s consent generate more significant 
positive externalities than reviews with permission.
186 See Wu, supra note 36.
187 See supra notes 100 to 103 and accompanying text. 
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2. Doctrinal efficiency 
To the extent it effectively forecloses opportunities for the application of the fair 
use doctrine, the market failure test is appealing in terms of administrative efficiency.  
However, adopting the market failure test in its current form would constitute a 
significant expansion of copyright scope.  Invariably requiring the defendant to establish 
market failure implicitly assumes that the copyright owner’s rights are absolute and that 
any deviation from those rights requires substantial justification. This formulation does 
not sit well with the either the text of the Copyright Act, or the case law applying the fair 
use doctrine.  All of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights under the Copyright Act are 
expressly qualified as “subject to” fair use.188 Although the courts have been less than 
clear as to the exact procedural status of fair use,189 the fact that, procedurally, fair use 
must be asserted as an affirmative defense,190 does not mean that it is always the 
defendant who carries the burden of proof once the defense has been properly raised.191
In short, the market failure approach to fair use would be doctrinally efficient, but 
if applied in its current form it would also significantly expand the scope of copyright. As 
suggested above, the market failure approach would be improved if it was modified to 
include a more discriminating allocation of the burden of proof. Admittedly, modifying 
188 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2005).
189 Compare Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449 (1984), with
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994).
190
 SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1260 (11th Cir. 2001). See also
Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1542 (11th Cir. 1996).
191
 The Supreme Court’s Sony decision implies that the burden of establishing fair use shifts 
according whether the defendant’s use was “commercial” or “non-commercial.” Sony Corp. of Am. v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449 (1984) (“If the Betamax were used  to make copies for a 
commercial or profit-making purpose, such use would presumptively be unfair. The contrary presumption is 
appropriate here…”). See also Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 970 (9th 
Cir. 1992) (“Game Genie users are engaged in a non-profit activity. Their use of the Game Genie to create 
derivative works therefore is presumptively fair.”)
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this rather arbitrary feature of the test would reduce the efficiency of the doctrine to some 
degree, but trade would seem to be worthwhile. 
3. Variation in the Scope-Welfare Relationship 
The third metric asks whether the recommended application is feasible in light of 
the expectation that there will be substantial variation, both within and between industries, 
in the welfare-scope relationship. Gordon’s market failure test addresses this by calling 
for a cost-benefit analysis in the event that the defendant is able to establish market 
failure. This necessarily incorporates a case-by- case cost-benefit analysis, and thus takes 
on all of the problems of that approach, as discussed in Part III.C., below.
However, there is no reason that a market failure approach must incorporate a 
cost-benefit analysis. The market failure approach accounts for variation in the efficiency 
of private ordering, which in turn is a significant determinant of variation in scope-
welfare relationship generally. Once a court has determined that the relevant market 
should be presumed to have failed, or has been shown to have failed, a cost-benefit 
analysis seems unnecessary. 
Consequently, viewed in its best light, the market failure approach to fair use 
addresses the variation in the scope-welfare relationship by focusing on a substantial 
cause of that variation – the efficiency of private ordering. 
4. Overall Assessment of the Market Failure Theory 
The clear strength of the market failure approach to fair use is that it recognizes 
the centrality of the efficiency of private ordering and is responsive to variation in the 
efficiency of private ordering. The primary weakness of the market failure approach is its 
uniform allocation of the burden of proof with respect to the existence of market failure. 
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This feature both predisposes the test to false positives, and is inconsistent with the 
judicial application of the fair use doctrine. 
In the final analysis, the market failure approach to fair use performs well when 
assessed against the metrics developed in this article, but the metrics also highlight ways 
in which the market failure test could be improved. Principally, the market failure 
approach to fair use should adopt a more discerning basis for allocating the burden of 
proof. One method of doing this is to apply some of the observations form game theory, 
behavioral economics and industrial organization to identify scenarios where the market 
is likely to fail, or scenarios in which the potential consequences of market failure justify 
a presumption that errs in favor of finding fair use. 
C. Applying the Metrics to Cost-benefit Approach 
1. The Efficiency of Private Ordering 
In contrast to the explicit focus of the market failure test, the cost benefit approach 
to fair use only considers the efficiency of private ordering by implication. The cost 
benefit approach presumes that courts can vary the application of copyright according to 
the author’s need for copyright incentives. Given the high degree of judicial dexterity 
already assumed by the cost benefit approach, it seems reasonable to assume judges could
also take into consideration the likelihood that rights will be effectively redistributed by 
the market. 
In the ideal case, a judge with perfect information could exactly tailor the 
application of the fair use doctrine to maximize net social welfare, i.e. to find the optimal 
level of copyright scope.  In reality, this is quite infeasible, but even if it was possible, the 
costs of such an exercise would overwhelm the benefits. In the alternative, the ability of a 
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judge to make the same kind of determination in a more generalized, industry-wide cost-
benefit analysis is also questionable. This is because a test-case decision on the fairness of 
a particular use may be needed before copyright owners can be expected to establish 
workable market mechanisms. For example, one could argue that the Supreme Court’s 
Sony decision was ill-advised because, if the Court had found time-shifting was not fair 
use, content producers and technology manufacturers would have inevitably negotiated 
some kind of compensation system to allow the technology to develop.192 So, while the 
fact that a particular set of facts has resulted in litigation may itself indicate a specific 
failure of private ordering, that failure itself may have been the product of legal 
uncertainty rather than defective market structure. 
In sum, the cost benefit approach to fair use fails to offer a plausible method to 
evaluate and or respond to the variation in the efficiency of private ordering. 
2. Doctrinal Efficiency 
The second metric by which law and economics doctrinal recommendations 
should be assessed relates to doctrinal efficiency. As discussed in Part II.C., any notional 
welfare gains alleged to result from an expansion of copyright scope must be off set 
against any welfare losses associated with the particular doctrinal change used to 
implement that change in scope. Failure to account for the high costs and speculative 
benefits of asking judges to fine tune the scope of copyright is the main defect of the 
paradigmatic cost benefit approach to fair use. 
Although both Fisher and Lunney are somewhat vague about the level of detail to 
which a cost-benefit analysis should descend, both suggest that courts should analyze the 
192 Alternatively, a statutory royalty may have been imposed by either the courts or the legislature. 
See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 499 (1984)
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balance of competing interests of the copyright owner and the public; and that resulting 
balance should then be applied to determine whether a particular use is fair or foul, based 
on its net contribution to social welfare.193  Fisher and Lunney each acknowledge the 
practical difficulties inherent in resolving fair use cases through a judicial cost-benefit 
analysis, yet both also advocate that approach nonetheless.194
Lunney is more detailed about what he thinks courts should do. He argues that in 
order to prevail against an assertion of fair use, copyright owners should demonstrate both 
that the use in question presents a “meaningful likelihood of actual or future harm” to the 
value of the work,195 and that such harm will translate into a negative marginal effect on 
the output of creative works.196  If, and only if, both reduction in market value and 
reduction in incentives are established by the copyright owner, should courts then balance 
the harm to the copyright owner with the public’s interest in allowing the use to continue 
nonetheless.197
Some clue as to the extent of particularization required by Lunney’s approach is 
found in his examples. Lunney illustrates the logic of his cost-benefit analysis through a 
detailed analysis of the economics of allowing unauthorized time-shifting of broadcast 
television through digital video recorders.198  Lunney’s intricate cost-benefit analysis of 
193
 Lunney, supra note 131, at 999; Fisher, supra note131, at 1699. 
194
 Lunney argues that “[a]lthough striking such an ideal balance in every case remains beyond the 
reach of our current legal and economic understanding, we can come considerably closer to the ideal 
balance by examining the competing public interests directly, rather than by continuing to rely on the four 
nineteenth century factors.” Lunney, supra note 131, at 999. Similarly, Fisher asks rhetorically “[i]f such a 
comparative analysis must be employed in most cases, is not economic analysis in this doctrinal context 
hopelessly impracticable? … Even so, the analysis may have considerable value. The assumptions used … 
were not wildly unrealistic. Some of the conclusions reached by the hypothetical judge may survive 
transition to the real world. Moreover, a simplified version of the procedure might enable a court at least to 
increase allocative efficiency, if not to maximize it.” Fisher, supra note 131, at 1718.
195
 Lunney, supra note 131, at 1000.
196 Id. at 1023.
197 Id.
198 Id. at 1000-14.  
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time-shifting would require a court to determine, (i) the correlation between advertising 
and consumer spending, (ii) the ratio of advertising to content on broadcast television, 
(iii) the extent to which consumer exposure to advertising has diminishing returns, (iv) the 
average consumer’s reduced consumption of advertising, and (v) the extent to which other 
forms of broadcast based advertising, such as product placement, would counteract the 
effect of commercial skipping DVRs.199
A highly specific cost-benefit analysis of the economic efficiency of granting (or 
denying) fair use appears to be both fundamentally impractical and inherently speculative. 
These concerns are addressed in turn. 
First, although courts are capable of deciding complex questions of fact and 
weighing expert testimony across a whole range of issues, the notion that a highly 
specified cost-benefit analysis would be an efficient use of scarce judicial resources 
strains credibility.  The extensive industry surveys and lengthy economists’ briefs 
required to answer such questions are likely to exceed the patience of most courts and the 
resources of most parties.  As many fair use cases involve new technologies, courts
should be particularly “mindful of the limitations facing judges where matters of 
technology are concerned.” 200
Second, finding the optimum level of copyright scope for any given market is 
inherently speculative.  For example, a court asked to rule against the use of lengthy plot 
summaries in film reviews would have to consider the following: (i) the potential increase 
199
 This fifth consideration was not mentioned by Lunney, which further illustrates the difficulty of 
the task he envisages. See Lunney, supra note 131.
200
 MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2792 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
(“Judges have no specialized technical ability to answer questions about present or future technological 
feasibilility or commercial viability where technology professionals, engineers, and venture capitalists 
themselves may radically disagree and where answers may differ depending upon whether one focuses upon 
the time of product development or the time of distribution.”).
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in revenue to the copyright holder from licensed plot summaries; (ii) the effect of that 
potential increase in revenue on the production of films; (iii) the potential decrease or 
increase in the public’s enjoyment of film reviews; and (iv) the likely effect on the 
public’s demand for films.  As with Lunney’s own example of the DVR, the net welfare 
consequences are extremely uncertain and could easily tip one way or the other based on 
minor changes in the court’s underlying assumptions.
Adding to this impracticality is the possibility of unforeseen interactions between 
variables.  The peculiar economics of intellectual and creative output may result in 
unauthorized uses actually benefiting copyright owners,201 in spite of vigorous 
protestations to the contrary.  An unauthorized use might expand the market for the 
original work and thus benefit the copyright owner. The Sony decision provides the 
paradigm example: in 1981 the head of the Motion Picture Association of America 
(MPAA) told Congress that “the VCR is to the American film producer and the American 
public as the Boston strangler is to the woman home alone.”202  And yet, MPAA members 
now earn a significant proportion of their revenues from VCR sales and DVD sales;203 the 
Boston strangler was never so generous. The Supreme Court’s willingness to speculate as 
to the potential market expansive effects of unauthorized uses in what was widely 
perceived as a test case, does not itself suggest that courts should routinely engage in this 
201
 Gregory M. Duhl gives three examples of this perverse effect: unauthorized fan comics in 
Japan, unauthorized home video recording, and unauthorized music sampling. See Gregory M. Duhl, Old 
Lyrics, Knock-Off Videos, And Copycat Comic Books: The Fourth Fair Use Factor In U.S. Copyright Law, 
54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 665, 668 (2004).
202
 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R. 4794, H.R. 4808, H.R. 
5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of 
Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong, 2d Sess. 5 (1982) (statement of Jack Valenti, 
President, Motion Picture Association of America).
203
 According to the MPAA, there was a $22 Billion market for DVDs and VHS tapes in the U.S. 
alone in 2002. See Motion Picture Association of America, 2003 Piracy Fact Sheets: US Overview, 
available at http://www.mpaa.org/PiracyFactSheets/PiracyFactSheetUS.pdf.
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kind of speculation, or that similar cases should be reargued whenever there is a minor 
change in the underlying economics of the broadcast industry (such as a demographic 
shift) or the technology of home recording (such as a faster fast-forward button). 
Of course, impracticality is not necessarily fatal to a proposed legal reform; the 
suggested course of action can be taken as aspirational, not literal. Fisher argues that 
courts would benefit from implementing his proposed cost-benefit analysis in spite of its
practical limitations.  According to Fisher, the method has value as a means through 
which courts might at least “increase allocative efficiency, if not to maximize it.”204
However, a highly specified cost-benefit analysis of the merits of fair use is not simply an 
unrealistic ideal, it is fundamentally ill-conceived. The root of the problem is that a highly 
specified cost-benefit analysis trades doctrinal efficiency for the promise of more perfect 
allocative efficiency, a promise that is in most cases simply illusory.  
In addition to its practical limitations in any given case, the benefits of a highly 
specified cost-benefit approach to fair use are almost certainly outweighed by its broader 
effects on the copyright system. First, an individuated cost-benefit analysis is inconsistent 
with the general universality of the copyright law. Copyright vests equally in grocery lists 
and love letters, which do not depend on copyright’s incentives for their production and 
distribution, as well as novels and encyclopedias, which typically do.  The extent of 
copyright protection does vary from work to work, because of the requirements of the 
idea-expression distinction, but this modification is independent of any assessment of the 
need for incentive.205  Asking courts to fine-tune copyright protection based on an 
204
 Fisher, supra note 131, at 1719. 
205 See, Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (Copyright in a factual 
compilation is thin. Notwithstanding a valid copyright, a subsequent compiler remains free to use the facts 
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assessment of the author’s need for incentive runs contrary to the universalism of the 
current copyright system.  As the Fifth Circuit held in Mitchell Brothers:
Congress has concluded that the constitutional purpose of its copyright power, to 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, is best served by allowing all 
creative works (in a copyrightable format) to be accorded copyright protection 
regardless of subject matter or content, trusting to the public taste to reward 
creators of useful works and to deny creators of useless works any reward. 206
Indeed, the more case-specific rules become, the less point there is to having a 
copyright system at all. As Louis Kaplow observed in relation to the intersection between 
antitrust law and patent law: 
In theory, direct reward systems are preferable because they avoid the monopoly 
costs associated with a general patent system. A central reason for reliance on a 
patent system is that it is thought to be too difficult to determine the appropriate 
level of reward fairly and accurately on a case-by- case basis. 207
The same reasoning applies to copyright and fair use. The cost-benefit logic 
suggests that, in every single case or at least in a highly specified subset of cases, judges 
should attempt to perfectly balance the author’s incentive requirements with the public 
benefits of increased access.  In any individual case, this analysis is unlikely to be able to 
be properly undertaken by any judge. In the aggregate, if this approach were taken, any 
welfare gains achieved by fine-tuning copyright scope would be outweighed by the losses 
in doctrinal efficiency.  Doctrinal efficiency in copyright necessitates both under-
protection and over-protection; consequently, even copyright pessimists must endure 
some measure of optimism for the sake of an efficient universal system. In terms of the 
copyright system generally, highly specified cost-benefit judging would make copyright 
contained in another's publication to aid in preparing a competing work, so long as the competing work does 
not feature the same selection and arrangement.)
206
 Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 855 (5th Cir. 1979) (quotes 
omitted). 
207
 Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1844 
(1984).
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legislation redundant. Indeed, the logical conclusion of the cost-benefit approach is that 
legislative guidance on copyright law should be entirely replaced by individually crafted 
judicial determinations of rights.
Second, any benefits of applying a cost-benefit approach to fair use in individual 
cases would also be outweighed by its broader effects on the copyright system, because 
the narrow fact findings of such cases would have little or no value as precedent.  In our 
common law judicial system, litigation has both a private and public benefit: it resolves 
disputes between the parties and develops and/or clarifies the law for the benefit of all 
society.208  If fair use decisions were arrived at by comparing the precise social value of 
additional authorship resulting from prohibiting an unauthorized use against the social 
value of allowing the unauthorized use to continue, subsequent cases with similar facts 
could be decided differently based only on esoteric questions of valuation or minor 
changes in the underlying markets.  The cost benefit approach invites the losing plaintiffs 
in the Sony case to start litigation all over again in response to demographic changes or 
shifts in consumer tastes.  Any change in these factors could tip the balance of competing 
interests between the copyright owners and the public, even though none of them relate to 
the actions of VCR manufacturers.
The chilling effect of law without significant precedent value poses a significant 
threat to continued innovation in technologies that have both infringing and non-
infringing uses and to free expression more generally. The entire purpose of the staple 
article of commerce doctrine applied in Sony is to provide ex ante certainty to those who 
208 Frank Partnoy, Synthetic Common Law, 53 KAN. L. REV. 281 (2005) (Explaining the theory that 
“by reporting decisions, courts generate a public record of what otherwise would be only unwritten law, 
customs, and oral legal traditions. Especially in the business context, the certainty generated by a written 
record is essential; common law provides certainty by enabling parties to rely on reported judicial 
decisions.”)
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develop new products.209 The aim of the staple article of commerce doctrine is clearly 
undermined if the results of litigated cases are so easily disturbed as the logic of a cost 
benefit analysis implies. As Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in Grokster explains, 
without the ability to rely on the existence of a substantial non-infringing use: 
Inventors and entrepreneurs (in the garage, the dorm room, the corporate lab, or 
the boardroom) would have to fear (and in many cases endure) costly and 
extensive trials when they create, produce, or distribute the sort of information 
technology that can be used for copyright infringement. … The additional risk and 
uncertainty would mean a consequent additional chill of technological 
development.210
The Supreme Court’s emphasis on a case-by- case approach to fair use does not 
suggest that all traces of precedent should be removed from fair use jurisprudence.211
Indeed, the Court has crafted broad fair use exemptions for both parody and criticism 
which are entirely untethered to a cost benefit analysis. As the Court clearly stated in 
Campbell: 
[T]here is no protectable derivative market for criticism. The market for potential 
derivative uses includes only those that creators of original works would in 
general develop or license others to develop. Yet the unlikelihood that creators of 
imaginative works will license critical reviews or lampoons of their own 
productions removes such uses from the very notion of a potential licensing 
market.212
209
 MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2791 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
210 Id. at 2793.
211
 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 577, 581 (1994) (The task is not to be simplified 
with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis.); Harper 
& Row, 471 U.S. 549, 561, 597; Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 495 
(1984).
212
 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994). Admittedly, the clarity of this 
statement is somewhat diminished by the Court’s insistence that the adjudication of fair use cases is “not to 
be simplified with bright-line rules.” Id. at 277. 
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Congress has clearly indicated that the courts should continue to develop the fair 
use doctrine through the common law.213 The common law requires the development of 
principles, not the mere determination of cases. Decided cases should offer some 
guidance to copyright owners and members of the public alike, as to which activities are 
likely to be infringing and which are not.  
Furthermore, doctrinal efficiency is far more than just a question of the frequency 
of litigation.  Reliance on the judicial process (or an administrative process) magnifies the 
level of uncertainty faced by all potential parties and multiplies opportunities for strategic 
behavior.214 As I have suggested elsewhere, it may be the case that the uncertainty costs 
of a flexible fair use doctrine are worth the benefits,215 but it would still be wise to try to 
keep those costs contained.  In its paradigm form, the cost-benefit approach treats welfare 
as purely determined by the sum of costs and benefits in individual cases, without regard 
to either the costs of state action or the likely multiplication of cases and threats of 
litigation. 
3. Variation in the Scope-Welfare Relationship 
The third metric that can be used to assess law and economics doctrinal 
recommendations focuses on the variation and complexity of the scope-welfare 
relationship. It asks whether the recommended application is feasible in light of the 
expectation that there will be substantial variation, both within and between industries, in 
the welfare-scope relationship.  The paradigm case by case cost-benefit analysis clearly 
213
 In enacting 17 U.S.C. § 107, Congress meant to restate existing judicial doctrine of fair use, not 
to change, narrow, or enlarge doctrine in any way, and intended that courts continue common law tradition 
of fair-use adjudication. See Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994).
214 See Part II. C., supra.
215
 Sag, supra note 14.
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addresses the need to account for variation in the scope-welfare relationship, but it must 
be rejected under the doctrinal efficiency criteria for the reasons given above.  A more 
broadly based cost benefit approach to fair use, one that varied industry by industry, as 
opposed to case by case, avoids most of the gross doctrinal inefficiency of the paradigm 
model but necessarily trades off greater efficiency for a less nuanced account of variation 
in the welfare-scope relationship. 
Arguably, the paradigm case is just an idealization, and is not meant to be taken 
literally. However, even if we assume that a cost-benefit approach should be applied in a 
more general fashion, to classes of works, rather than individual works,216 we are still left 
with the problem of deciding where to draw the boundaries between classes.  
Although tailoring specific doctrines to the need for incentives in particular 
industries may be desirable in theory, its application is hazardous. There are at least five 
hazards worth exploring:
(1) Industries are constantly evolving, thus industry definitions are inherently 
fluid and resist legal definition;
(2) Legal proceedings may become dominated by questions of taxonomy as 
the parties lobby for competing industry definitions;
(3) Intra-industry variation may be just as significant as inter-industry 
variation depending on the level of generality of the industry definition 
used;
(4) Inter-industry effects are likely to be ambiguous; 
216
 Loren seems to indicate the former, Lunney the later. See Loren, supra note 133, at __; Lunney, 
supra note 131.
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(5) Industry tailoring may have negative effects on the overall political 
economy of copyright law.
This is not to suggest that industry tailoring is never appropriate, rather that its feasibility
must be carefully considered. However, an industry tailoring approach to the fair use 
doctrine seems particularly unworkable for all of the reasons given above. 
The first three hazards relate to the difficulty of defining exactly where one 
industry stops and another begins. Although a number of authors have recommended a 
status driven approach to fair use, one that preferences educators, scientists and news 
reporters,217 it is by no means clear what the boundaries of any of these classes might be. 
The broader the industry definition used, the more likely it is that intra-industry 
variation be as significant as the inter-industry variation which supposedly justified a 
tailored approach to fair use. But even within a fairly narrow industry definition, such as 
computer software, incentive effects and requirements for copyright protection can differ. 
As Yochai Benkler argues, expansionist intellectual property regimes tend to favor some 
producers and disfavor others, depending on their information production strategy.218
Open source software and commercial software often compete side by side in the market 
place, but their production strategies are radically different.  So in spite of being in the 
same industry, information producers may well differ in their reliance on direct 
appropriation of their information outputs, they will be differently affected by an 
expansion of intellectual property rights. The more a producer relies on direct 
appropriation of its information outputs, the more likely it is to find that the increased 
217 See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 131, at 1744.
218
 Benkler, supra note 96.
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costs of greater copyright scope are matched by increased revenues.219  In contrast, 
information production strategies that rely on indirect appropriation and non-monetary 
gains are likely to be prejudiced by an increase in copyright scope.
The fourth consideration is that even if a court was presented with sufficient 
evidence to determine the optimal level of copyright scope for a particular market, it 
would then have to consider how changes in one market might distort other markets.  For 
example, finding the optimum trade-off between increasing incentives and reducing the 
cost of expression for a particular genre of novels might distort the downstream market 
for screen-plays in the same genre, some of which are derived from novels and some of 
which are not.  However well intended, tilting the scales of copyright in one market is 
likely to have unintended consequences and potential multiplier effects in other markets.  
These judgments need to be based on sound theoretical approaches and/or broad based 
empirical evidence, not merely a cost-benefit analysis of one narrow case or class of 
cases.
The fifth consideration is that an industry level cost-benefit analysis would 
significantly expand opportunities for rent seeking in copyright law.  If judges explicitly 
craft rules to apply differently to particular industries, the ability of those industries to 
lobby Congress for particularized benefits will only increase. While there are numerous 
examples of special interest rent seeking in the current copyright law, this type of 
particularism is limited by the universalism of copyright. As such, industry based cost-
benefit rules may well subvert the aims of their proponents.220
219 Id. at 83.
220
 Dan Burk and Mark Lemley raise a similar concern with respect to industry differentiation in 
patent law. Although Burk and Lemley have advocated tailoring patent protection to the needs of specific 
industries in light of industry based variation in economic evidence, patent doctrine, and legal theory, they 
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4. Overall assessment of the Cost-Benefit Approach to Fair Use  
In its paradigm form, the cost benefit approach to fair use fails to account for the 
high costs and speculative benefits of asking judges to fine tune the scope of copyright. 
Various applications of the market failure approach have been rightly criticized for simply 
presuming the efficiency of private ordering without any serious empirical or theoretical 
inquiry.221 The opposite criticism can be leveled at the cost-benefit approach to fair use. 
The implicit assumption of the cost benefit approach to fair use is that every litigated fair 
use case represents a failure of private ordering and that such failures will continue even 
after judicial resolution of like cases. The cost-benefit approach is also limited by its 
failure to recognize the significance of the significant costs associated with its (arguably 
futile) pursuit of more perfect allocative efficiency.
Is there an alternative? An industry based cost-benefit analysis of fair use 
incorrectly focuses on the status of the defendant, rather than the nature of her conduct. 
An alternative approach to fair use that may meet many of the objectives of the cost 
benefit approach is to concentrate on identifying situations in which fair use should be 
presumed. Such an approach is consistent with the current doctrinal framework of fair 
use, it can be incorporated into the general market failure framework and it lends itself to 
the application of economic analysis in the form of game theory and many other 
analytical tool-sets.
concede that there are a number of risks inherent in such a technology-specific approach. In particular, they 
acknowledge because of “concerns about rent seeking and the inability of industry-specific statutes to 
respond to changing circumstances, … we should not jettison our nominally uniform patent system in favor 
of specific statutes that protect particular industries.” Burk & Lemley, supra note 104, 1578-79.  However, 
as Polk Wagner points out, these political economy concerns should not be confined to legislative 
particularism. R. Polk Wagner, Exactly Backwards: Exceptionalism and the Federal Circuit, 54 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 749, 755 (2004).
221 See Cohen, supra note 5, at 465 (criticizing the assumptions of those who predict the 
irrelevance of fair use in cyberspace as unproven and unjustified in the case of creative and informational 
works).
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D. Revisiting the Law and Economics Theories of Fair Use 
The aim of this article was develop an economic model of copyright scope and 
doctrinal efficiency as a vehicle for evaluating the welfare implications of changes in the 
breadth of the rights vested in copyright owners. In order to make the transition from 
abstract theory to practical implementation, a set of metrics were established to assess 
specific doctrinal recommendations. The metrics do not definitively determine which 
doctrinal proposals are either efficient or normatively desirable, but they are useful in 
both filtering out some ill-conceived recommendations, and identifying areas for 
improvement in others.  
The application of these metrics to the predominant law and economics theories of 
fair use undertaken in this Part illustrates the potential of this approach. This metric 
driven analysis demonstrates the general robustness of the market failure approach to fair 
use and the relative frailty of the competing cost benefit approach. Importantly, the 
application of the metrics also indicates how the market failure approach can be 
improved. 
This article’s main substantive recommendation with respect to the fair use 
doctrine is that the market failure approach should be modified to incorporate a more 
discerning basis for allocating the burden of proof. One method of doing this is to apply 
some of the observations from game theory, behavioral economics and industrial 
organization to identify scenarios where the market is likely to fail, or scenarios in which 
the potential consequences of market failure justify a presumption that errs in favor of 
finding fair use. This approach is preferable to an industry tailored cost benefit approach 
because it asks courts to focus on the nature of the defendant’s conduct, not her broader 
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status or affiliation. Courts should continue to develop the common law of fair use and 
attempt to identify situations in which the failure of the market for permissions should be 
presumed.  Courts already appear to make this presumption with respect to parody, 
criticism, review, trivial quotation and the reverse engineering of computer software. This 
situational approach preserves the flexibility of the common law, is easily incorporated 
into a market failure framework, and lends itself to the application of sophisticated 
economic analysis in a form that courts can actually use.
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CONCLUSION  
The significant and growing influence of law and economics analysis of copyright 
is a positive development. Economics provides powerful analytical tools for 
understanding the nature of the copyright system and the costs and benefits of a range of 
policy recommendations. As David Friedman observes, at the most fundamental level, the 
subject of economics is not money or the economy, but the implications of rational choice 
in response to incentives.222 Economics is an essential tool for understanding the effects 
of legal rules.223 Economic analysis is particularly useful in that it allows us to simplify 
complex problems to see the larger picture and to abstract from specific situations to more 
general principles. However, the potential problem with law and economics theories of 
copyright is that they may overlook significant factors in the course of this abstraction. 
Uncertainty as to the optimum extent of protection has generally limited the 
capacity of law and economics to translate economic theory into coherent doctrinal 
recommendations in the realm of copyright. By exploring the relationship between 
copyright scope, doctrinal efficiency and welfare from a theoretical perspective, this 
article has developed a framework for evaluating specific doctrinal recommendations in 
copyright law.
The analysis of copyright scope and doctrinal efficiency developed in this article 
leads to four conclusions, three of which in turn provide useful metrics or benchmarks for 
assessing doctrinal recommendations. The first (by no means novel) conclusion is that the 
ideal extent of copyright scope must be both more than nothing, and less than everything.  
222
 David D. Friedman, LAW’S ORDER: WHAT ECONOMICS HAS TO DO WITH LAW AND WHY IT 
MATTERS 9 (2000)
223 Id.
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The more tractable implications of the theoretical exploration of the relationship between 
copyright scope and welfare are: (1) the efficiency of private ordering is the key 
determinant of the ideal level of copyright scope; (2) the complexity of the welfare-scope 
relationship is such that we are unlikely to be able to ascertain a generalizable optimal 
level of copyright scope – the relationship will clearly be subject to substantial variation, 
both within and between industries; (3) doctrinal recommendations which aim to optimize
copyright scope in the abstract but do not account for the effect of a doctrinal change on 
transaction costs, uncertainty or strategic behavior are necessarily incomplete.  
This importance of this analysis has been discussed primarily in relation to law 
and economics theories of secondary liability for consumer infringement and the fair use 
doctrine. However, there is no reason to think that the utility of this metric driven method 
of analysis should be limited to those two areas. Given the broad reach of modern 
copyright and the intense policy debates it generates, there is likely to be shortage of 
reform proposals to which this method can be applied. It is becoming increasingly 
common to think of copyright doctrines as levers to be adjusted in the pursuit of a more 
perfectly tailored legal system. But, as this article has demonstrated, merely presenting 
the potential benefits of a more perfectly tailored copyright system does not provide a 
mechanism to select which lever to pull or to understand when the costs of such tailoring 
are likely to exceed the benefits.  The metric driven analysis presented in this article 
provides one such mechanism and may help move the law and economics of copyright 
beyond abstraction. 
